THE DYNAMICS OF SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN A CANDIDATE COUNTRY: THE CASE OF TURKEY

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A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department

of Political Science

University of Houston

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In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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By

Burcu Gezgör

November 2014

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ABSTRACT

Turkey has been an associate member of the EU since 1963 and became a candidate country for the EU membership in 1999. It is only recently that empirical studies focusing on the Turkish attitudes towards the EU membership have emerged. The existing literature fails to provide a clear and comprehensive picture of Turkish public opinion on the EU. Hence, this study examines the determinants of Turkish public support for the EU membership over the past decade. Using Eurobarometer and Transatlantic Trends surveys, I test whether theories of support for EU integration that were developed to study attitudes in Western Europe and Eastern Europe are applicable to explain the Turkish case. In particular, I emphasize three major factors: economic considerations (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998), domestic political considerations (Anderson 1998), and identity (McLaren 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004).

The analysis of longitudinal data shows that while economic evaluations are good predictors of attitudes, the effect of sociotropic evaluations is not static since they change character over time, and that human capital variables do not play a role in the formation of attitudes. The results show that attitudes towards EU are strongly shaped by proxies rooted in domestic policies, such as trust in national government and party cues. The results also suggest that in the presence of elite consensus, the support for the EU membership was high while when the elite consensus decreased, the level of public support also decreased. Finally, this analysis demonstrates that Turks' concern about the potential loss of their cultural identity has a significant impact on their attitudes.

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CHAPTER 1 –
Introduction

When the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, the objective was to modernize and to reach the level of contemporary civilization. Ataturk, the founder of Turkey, believed that Westernization was the road to be chosen. In pursuit of these goals, Turkey applied for associate membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959. In addition, Turkey joined the Council of Europe in 1949. It became one of the founding members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961 and of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1973. In that regard, applying for membership in EEC was the next step to be part of Europe. Muftuler-Bac (2007) states that Greece application for associate member status was also a factor in Turkish application for associate membership. Turkey applied for full European Economic Community membership in 1987. Since 1999, Turkey has been an official EU candidate member. Yet despite this long courtship, ordinary Turks do not necessarily look favorably on EU membership. According to Eurobarometer surveys, public support for the EU among the Turkish public dropped from 67 % in 2002 to 36 % in 2011. Why has this changed, and what are the determinants of public opinion in Turkey towards the EU? To what extent are theories of support for EU integration that were developed to study attitudes in Western Europe and Eastern Europe applicable to explain the Turkish case? These are the questions I want to answer in this dissertation.

In the early years of the EEC/EU application, *permissive consensus* was the norm in regards to European Communities matters throughout Europe. Citizens did not have much knowledge and they trusted the political elite to make decisions on their behalf (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998). Public support for the European project began to erode across Europe following the Maastricht agreement in 1992. Eichenberg and Dalton (2007, 139) use the term "Post-Maastricht Blues" to define the transformation of citizen support. A more recent study (Armingeon and Ceka, 2014) draws attention to the decline in EU support in the aftermath of the recession of 2007. According to surveys, 58 percent of people living in EU member states said membership was a good thing in 2007 but by 2011 this number had dropped to 47 percent. Over the years, as the EU was deepening and enlarging, people became more aware of the EU's impact in their lives. As a result, public opinion started to influence the integration process through lobbying, public protest, elections and referendums. Hence, the study of public attitudes first conceptualized as *public support*, later as *Euroscepticism*, has generated a great deal of scholarly interest. Euroscepticism is defined as ranging from contingent or qualified opposition to outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration (Taggart 1998, 366). In their seminal study of Euroscepticism in candidate states of Central and Eastern European countries, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004, 3) differentiated between "hard" and "soft" Euroscepticism. According to them, "hard" Euroscepticism implies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration, and opposition to one's country joining or remaining a member of the EU whereas "soft" involves contingent or qualified opposition to European integration. It

may take the form of 'policy' Euroscepticism or 'national-interest' Euroscepticism, although these often overlap.

As in the member states in the early years of European integration, permissive consensus was the initial norm in the background of Turkey-EU relations. Hence, many studies of Turkish attitudes towards the EU (McLaren 2000; McLaren and Muftuler-Bac 2003; Senyuva 2011) focused on elite opinion in different time periods rather than looking at general public attitudes. The main focus of research in this area has been on technicalities of the negotiation process and EU citizens' attitudes towards Turkish accession (De Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko, 2008; Gerhards and Hans, 2011; McLaren 2007). This permissive consensus began to change in the twenty-first century. The European debate first appeared on the Turkish public agenda when the Turkish parliament discussed several reform packages in order to meet the political aspects of Copenhagen criteria between 2001 and 2004. Furthermore, the inclusion of Turkey in the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer of the European Commission in 2001 made clear that what the Turkish public thinks had become of interest for Brussels as well (Senyuva 2006). Hence, we now have a lot more data if we want to study what Turkish people think about the European Union. However, until recently only a few studies empirically examined Turkish attitudes towards the EU (Kentmen, 2008; Kentmen and Carkoglu 2011; Jolly and Oktay 2012). Moreover, some of the studies were descriptive, some focused on one point in time while some used pooled data (Carkoglu 2003; Kentmen 2008; Yilmaz 2011). Furthermore, the studies that have been conducted have used different datasets, whose different variables have produced different results. As a result, many questions remain about what shaped Turkish attitudes towards Europe. To remedy

this shortcoming, this dissertation will test the main theories from the existing literature, asking whether Turkish public opinion is driven by proxies, by domestic political considerations, economic calculus or concerns about the loss of cultural identity. I will utilize Eurobarometer surveys conducted between 2002 and 2012 and Transatlantic Trends surveys conducted between 2004 and 2013, using longitudinal data to establish which factors account for long-terms changes in attitudes.

Understanding the nature of public sentiments toward the EU in the candidate countries is important for several reasons. First, although not necessarily constitutionally mandated, candidate countries are likely to hold referendums once negotiations over accession are concluded and final decisions made about whom to admit and when. This is true for Turkey but also for future candidate members - and possibly for current members holding referendums on opting out, as the UK is threatening to do. Second, EU membership appears prominently in partisan debates and electoral appeals. Third, successful transition to prospective membership necessitates citizens' commitment to market economy and consolidation of democracy. (Slomczynski, and Shabad 2003). The Copenhagen criteria require that the candidate country adopt the entire body of EU laws, known as the *acquis communautaire* and support the political, economic, and monetary aims of the European Union. The adoption, implementation and enforcement of EU's legislation cannot be carried out without public support. In terms of research implication, a single case study of a candidate country will provide the opportunity to test theories of EU support, review the existing approaches and improve our understanding of support for the EU in a different context.

In addition to being a candidate country, Turkey is an interesting case for many other reasons as well. Turkey is a democratic and secular state with a predominantly Muslim population. Turkey is the only candidate country that EU established Customs Union *without membership.* Turkey has been waiting to become a member for a long time, longer than any other candidate in the history of EU. Furthermore, the negotiations are defined as open-ended, and the outcome cannot be guaranteed (European Council 2005). While some in the EU have questioned whether full membership for Turkey is really credible under EU membership standards, in Turkey this long process has led to the perception that EU is using double standard towards Turkey's accession (Muftuler-Bac 2007). When the EU opened negotiations between Turkey and the EU in 2005, arguments about the definition of *European or European-ness* came to the forefront (Muftuler-Bac, and Taskin 2007). Turkey's accession is considered as one of the most contentious issues in contemporary Europe.(De Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko, 2008)

Turkey's Relations with the EU and the Turkish Political Scene

Since attitudes towards the EU are formed and shaped in the context of Turkish-EU relations, it is useful to begin with a brief overview of Turkey's relations with the EU. In 1959, Turkey applied for associate membership to join the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1963, Turkey and the EEC signed the Association agreement known as the Ankara Agreement that aimed to create a customs union between Turkey and the EU. The customs union was seen as a step toward membership. In 1987, Turkey applied to become a full member in the EEC. In 1995, the customs union came into

effect. In 1997, the European Council in Luxembourg reaffirmed Turkey's eligibility for membership. In 1999, Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate country by the Helsinki European Council. In 2001, the Accession Partnership for Turkey was established. Since then accession negotiation has been revised three times: in 2003, 2006 and 2008. Turkey's candidate status marked the beginning of a series of extensive constitutional and legislative reforms.

Kalaycioglu (2011) states that coalition governments proposed the constitutional amendments of the 1990s and of 2001s and these were adopted by large majorities in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) of a highly fragmented and polarised legislature. This implied that despite their differences, Turkish parties came together in pursuit of EU membership. This scene changed in 2002 when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) received two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly even though it got only 34 per cent of the vote, due to d'Hondt system of proportional representation and 10 percent electoral threshold.

Once in power, AKP did not have to negotiate with the major opposition parties to adopt constitutional amendments - including amendments related to reforms that were required for EU membership. It is important to note that when AKP, the ruling party with clear Islamic roots, became the proponent of Europeanization, this contradicted the opinion that Islamists disapprove of Western values. Kentmen (2008) states that the reason these groups become suddenly supporters of liberalism and democracy was because they saw freedom of thought and freedom of religion as a way to achieve their goals in the public sphere.

The Accession Partnership identified priority areas for Turkey's membership preparations, one of which was to find a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. Given the prospects of EU membership, AKP government denounced the hard line position towards the Cyprus issue and stopped supporting Rauf Denktas, nationalist leader of the Turkish Cypriots (Yilmaz 2011). After losing the Turkish government's support, Denktas lost in presidential elections and then his party lost its parliamentary majority. The new government headed by Mehmet Ali Talat mobilized Turkish Cypriots to say "yes" to the plan for a solution to Cyprus problem. In April 2004, a referendum was held on a UN-sponsored unity plan known as the Annan Plan to reunite the country. While it was approved by 65 % of Turkish Cypriots, it was rejected by 76 % of Greek Cypriots. Nonetheless, the EU welcomed Cyprus to join that year and expected that this action would resolve the *unresolved* Cyprus problem eventually. In May 2004, the Greek Cypriot-controlled 'Republic of Cyprus' became a full member of the EU. Jolly and Oktay (2012) describes the entry of Cyprus into Europe as one of the most dramatic episodes in Turkey-EU relations.

A 2004 report by the European Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession concluded that Turkey had substantially progressed in its political reform process and would bring into force the further legislation. As a result, the Commission recommended opening accession negotiations.

> "The political reforms are mainly contained in two major constitutional reforms in 2001 and 2004 and eight legislative packages adopted by Parliament between February 2002 and July 2004. Civil-military relations are evolving towards European standards. Important changes have been made to the judicial system, including the abolition of the State Security Courts. Public administration reform is underway. As regards human

> rights, Turkey recognizes the primacy of international and European law. It has aligned itself to a large extent with international conventions and rulings, such as the complete abolition of the death penalty and the release of people sentenced for expressing non-violent opinion. Although some practical restrictions still exist, the scope of fundamental freedoms enjoyed by Turkish citizens, such as freedom of expression and assembly, has been substantially extended. Civil society has grown stronger. Cultural rights for the Kurds have started to be recognized. The state of emergency has been lifted everywhere; although the situation is still difficult, the process of normalisation has begun in the Southeast. Finally, on the enhanced political dialogue, Turkish foreign policy is contributing positively to regional stability." (Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Turkey's progress towards accession, 2004)

It is important to note that two major issues, civil-military relations and cultural rights for Kurds, came to the forefront in the assessment of political criteria in this document. Furthermore, the report states that it is an open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand and adds that Turkey should be connected to European structures, no matter what the outcome is.

When a new wave of enlargement occurred in 2004 with the entrance of Central and Eastern European Countries, Malta and Cyprus, an additional protocol was signed to incorporate these countries into the EU-Turkish customs union (the "Ankara Protocol"). However, Turkey declared that she would continue non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and exclude Cyprus from the customs union. In 2006, in response to Turkey's rejection to apply the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement for Cyprus, the Council decided that eight relevant chapters would not be opened and no chapter would be provisionally closed until Turkey had fulfilled its commitment. The eight chapters are: Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to

Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations.

As mentioned before, in the early 2000s the Turkish government undertook reform packages partly in response to EU pressures. In this regard, Turkey has similarities to Greece, Spain and Portugal as these countries tried to adopt basic principles and norms of liberal democracy during their candidacy so that they could be included in the European community.

These involved constitutional changes in issues such as the Turkish military's role in politics, settlement of the Cyprus dispute, education in Kurdish language, improvement of minority rights, and abolition of the death penalty. The Turkish military had been seen as the defender of secularism and principles of Kemalism. When the reform process aimed at limiting the role of military in Turkish politics by abolishing the State Security Courts and increasing the number of civilian members in the National Security council, Turkey's republican values were seen as under threat due to AKP and its policies. Furthermore, the abolition of the death penalty as an entry condition for Turkey despite the fact that Turkey did not carry out an execution since 1984 was seen as a way to save from execution the terrorist group Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) leader, Abdullah Ocalan. Ocalan was captured and sentenced to death in 1999. Later, this sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. AKP's policies came under scrutiny by the opposition parties. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) blamed AKP as being submissive to EU demands. As a result, by about 2005 the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet

Halk Partisi, CHP) changed its pro-EU stance and began claiming that AKP was exploiting the EU-related democratic reforms to put an end to the secular order.

The Turkish government stopped promoting an EU agenda soon after Turkey began accession negotiations with the EU in 2005. Kalaycioglu (2011) argues that the government changed its focus from achievement of EU goals to consolidation of its power by trying to control the autonomous agencies of the state, from the Central Bank, Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) to the Council of Higher Education (YOK) and the rectors of the public universities. It is interesting to note that the government did not appoint a chief negotiator responsible for Turkey EU relations from 2005 to 2009. Over the years, while some chapters have been opened, some chapters have been blocked by France and the Greek Cypriot administration. Since 2008 accession negotiations have stood still. Turkey froze relations with the EU during the presidency of the Republic of Cyprus in 2012. Recently, the European Union promised to lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens in return for having illegal Turkish immigrants sent back to Turkey. In 2013, AKP government's undemocratic response to peaceful protests that started with protecting Gezi Park in Istanbul, and that spread widely across the country, brought a complete halt to the negotiations between the EU and Turkey. When the European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2013 on the situation in Turkey (2013/2664 (RSP)) warned the Turkish government due to its harsh actions against the peaceful protesters, prime minister Erdogan declared that he did not recognize the resolution and criticized the EU. According to Muftuler-Bac (2013) the Turkish government's reaction shows that "the EU no longer possesses the political clout in Turkey it once enjoyed". The recent events happening in Turkey under the AKP

government signal that Turkey is not moving forward on its path to consolidated liberal democracy. Banning the social media, oppressing the media, and eroding the rule of law are only a few of the many repressive measures that have recently been taken under AKP government.

As this brief historical overview has showed, over the years Turkey and EU relations came to a halt several times but then resumed. Although accession negotiations are currently stalled, if the past is any predictor of the future, efforts to continue the relation are likely to occur since neither Turkey nor the EU wants a break up. In future negotiations, as in the past, Turkish public opinion, not just elite opinion, will be crucial for the continuation of Turkey's efforts to become an EU member. This dissertation therefore seeks to shed light on the factors that have shaped Turkish opinion on this issue in the past, and that are likely to influence such attitudes in the future.

Dissertation Plan

The chapters that follow will provide more information about the context for understanding how to evaluate attitudes towards the EU, and will ask whether models developed in other contexts help to understand how Turkish citizens think about the EU.

Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature and forms the theoretical framework for the dissertation. This research will examine three major explanations of public support for EU integration: the role of economic considerations (Eichenberg, and Dalton 1993 Gabel 1998), domestic political considerations (Anderson 1998) and identity factors (Hooghe, and Marks 2004; McLaren 2002). In brief, economic factors include evaluations about national economic situation and personal economic situation and also

the effect human capital, political factors are identified as three proxies from domestic political context which are government, system and party support, and identity factors are represented by the effect of fear of cultural loss and pride in nationality. The first section looks at the theories that were developed to understand determinants of support for EU integration in the old member states and that were later applied or adapted to study attitudes in previous candidate countries. Then, I discuss the literature on Turkish public opinion. Finally, I introduce the hypotheses that will be tested in the following chapters.

Chapter 3 provides a first test of these hypotheses using data from twelve years' worth of Eurobarometer data. After presenting the results of tests of the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2, I evaluate the results by using simulation.

Chapter 4 complements the analysis of Chapter 3 by examining the link between different party constituents and EU support. Because the Eurobarometer polls do not contain information about Turkish respondents' partisan preferences, this chapter uses longitudinal data from Transatlantic Trends Surveys to answer questions about the role of domestic politics in shaping attitudes towards the EU.

The last chapter provides the conclusions I reached and the results' implications for research and for policy makers. I will also mention constraints of the research and provide recommendations for further research.

CHAPTER 2 –
Theories Revisited: the Case of Turkey

This chapter will explore the literature on public support for EU integration and form the theoretical framework to understand the Turkish case. First, I will focus on the main theories that were developed to understand determinants of support in Western Europe. Second, I will present an overview of studies that explain support for EU membership in candidate countries. Third, I will refer to the Turkish public opinion literature on the EU and provide my theoretical argument for the Turkish case. Next, drawing implications from the previous work, I formulate my hypotheses that will be empirically tested in the following chapter.

In the first wave of studies in this area, scholars (Anderson 1998; Brinegar, and Jolly 2005; Eichenberg, and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998; Gabel, and Whitten 1997; Hooghe, and Marks 2004; Inglehart 1970; Janssen 1991; McLaren 2002) studied attitudes towards the EU in Western Europe. When a new wave of enlargement took place, the geographical focus of studies shifted from Western Europe to Southern Europe and then to Central and Eastern Europe (Cichowski 2000; Herzog, and Tucker 2009; Elgun, and Tillman 2007; Rohrschneider, and Whitefield 2006; Slomczynski and Shabad 2003; Thomas 2005; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002; Tverdova and Anderson 2004).

What has driven the evolution of theories of support for the EU? Loveless and Rohrschneider (2008) state that our understanding of public opinion towards the EU has been driven by the considerations by which the EU itself has progressed. The "European

Union has developed on the basis of a commitment to a set of broad economic and political normative ideals: economically, this means support for liberal markets, which includes migration of workers and of capital; politically, the EU implies transferring sovereignty to a supranational government via new legislative, executive and judicial institutions" (Rohrschneider, and Whitefield 2006, 144). Furthermore, the authors refer to expectations that depend on the outcomes in both the political and economic areas since improvement in economic performance and social welfare is the promise of single economic market while improvement of quality of governance is the promise of EU political arrangements. Accordingly, support for the EU should be linked to attitudes towards these political and economic ideals and expectations.

De Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko (2008) summarize developments in the field by stating that the focus on hard economic and utilitarian predictors in explaining public attitudes towards the EU changed into an emphasis on soft predictors such as feelings of identity and attitudes towards immigrants.

The theories that have been formulated to understand the attitudes towards the EU in Western Europe were later adopted to understand determinants of public opinion in candidate countries. When testing whether previous theories are applicable to the new cases, scholars underlined that theories should take into account the particular context of these countries. They considered what the meaning of the EU was for citizens in their studies. In Greece, Spain and Portugal, EU membership was the goal to be achieved in order to strengthen democratic institutions and consolidate democracies. In Central and Eastern European countries, EU membership was regarded as an assurance that economic

and political reforms will be carried on. In those cases, citizens incorporate their views about domestic political and economic reforms when forming their opinion about the European Union. “If the EU serves as a symbol for democracy and the rule of free markets, people who share values consistent with the Western model and who see their country’s future as tied to countries in the West are likely to be supportive of EU membership” (Tverdova, and Anderson 2004, 190).

Furthermore, time is an important factor that affects the nature of public opinion in different ways (Loveless, and Rohrschneider 2008). Since member states were politically and economically connected to the EU earlier than candidate countries, citizens in member countries have more experience and knowledge related to the EU. Therefore, they might depend on their experience and knowledge about the EU when forming their opinion. If accession negotiations in applicant countries are advanced, media and political elites start to focus on the EU and discuss the benefits versus disadvantages of membership. Opinions also change during candidacy. When candidate countries become members, their main concerns change. For instance, concerns over economic affluence came to the forefront and replaced the concerns about the continuance of reforms undertaken during the process of transition in Central and Eastern Europe.

Over time, studies of support for integration started to employ hierarchical models that can enable the researchers to take into account other factors at different levels such as domestic economic and political conditions. Previous studies had used country dummies as controls.

After presenting this brief chronological overview of the development of studies in this field, it is time to turn to a more thematic exploration of the literature. For purposes of the theoretical framework developed in this research, it is useful to divide the main explanatory factors identified by previous studies into three major subgroups: economic considerations, domestic political considerations, and identity.

Economic Considerations

The historical roots of the EU lie in the Treaty of Rome that created the European Economic Community. The EEC as an economic organization aimed at promoting affluence and economic efficiency. Accordingly, the economic voting model has been applied by scholars to study the impact of economic conditions on support for the EU and integration process. This perspective identifies evaluations about the national economy and personal economic situation, and calculation of costs and benefits, as the main factors that influence citizen support for European integration (Anderson, and Kalthenthaler 1996; Eichenberg, and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998). At first, scholars employed a macro-level approach to examine the effect of the economy on attitudes. They argued that the economic performance of member states measured in terms of GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, level of trade with other EU countries and net national returns from the EU will have an influence when people are forming their attitudes towards the EU. However, they were not able to present empirical evidence consistent with their models. The problems associated with using macro level measures to understand micro level phenomena led scholars to employ measures of individual perceptions of personal economic situation and national economic performance (Gabel, and Whitten 1997).

Scholars (Duch, and Stevenson 2008) argued that extending the economic voting model to study EU support was problematic; they described this practice as theory drift. According to Duch and Stevenson, the effect of membership on national economic policies has been indirect. They doubt that the average citizen has the sophistication and knowledge to recognize this linkage. Up until now, evaluations of national and personal economic condition have been utilized by scholars to study support for EU integration. Over time, the increase in the information sources and more political debates and media coverage might have made this linkage clearer for the average citizen.

Gabel (1998) argued that market liberalization has a different impact on different regions and parts of the population. For instance, regions that are close to borders with other EU members will benefit more due to growing economic relations. Individuals' gains will depend on their personal economic competitiveness. Because of this, human capital (measured as education, and occupation) and economic resources determine whether a person can adapt successfully to the changing conditions (Anderson, and Reichert 1996 cited in Gabel 1998; Gabel, and Palmer 1995). Accordingly, it is expected that the people who are in the high socioeconomic stratum will assess the EU more positively than the people who are in the low socioeconomic stratum since they have the characteristics that help them make the most of benefits from the market liberalization.

These authors (Gabel and Palmer 1994; Gabel 1998; Tverdova Anderson 2004) hypothesize that high education and high income levels have positive significant effect on support for EU membership. In a longitudinal study of 12 EU member states, Hakhverdian et al. (2013) specifically explore the relation between educational

attainment and Euroscepticism. While the authors find support for the negative relation between educational attainment and Euroscepticism, they underline that the effect of education becomes stronger over time.

Furthermore, occupational characteristics come to the forefront in these economic models. Since skill levels have an impact on competitiveness, it is expected that skilled and unskilled workers will have different evaluations of the EU. Low skilled workers will be more skeptical of EU membership while professionals and executives will be positive towards EU membership. Farmers and fishermen are expected to evaluate membership more positively because they are paid subsidies resulting from the EU Common Agricultural Policy.

In contrast to the argument that lower-skilled workers will be less competitive in an integrated market and are therefore less likely to support EU integration, Jolly and Brinegar (2005, 156) argue that this might not hold true because the "competitive advantage of lower skilled workers on the international labor market is unlikely to be fixed across countries, labor conditions and employment opportunities vary substantially across the EU". These authors state that failure to take into account national contextual factors will provide an incomplete picture and lead to biased conclusions.

When studying attitudes toward EU membership in post-communist countries, Tucker et al. (2002) present a revised look at the utilitarian approach of Western experience. They state that citizens do not think about how EU membership will change their economic position in the future, as the utilitarian approach posits. Instead, they look at how their economic position has changed since the transition from communism.

According to the authors, one's status in the wake of the transition determines the attitudes towards EU integration. Hence, two groups are identified: "winners" who have benefited from the transition are more likely to support EU membership for their country than "losers" who have been hurt by the transition (Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002, 557). Furthermore, as membership means participating in a free market, it is expected that supporters of the free market will be more likely to support EU membership than those who oppose the free market. The authors use individuals' self-assessments of their economic progress during the transition in order to assess winners and losers.

Elgun and Tillman (2007) also suggest a revision of utilitarian theory for studying EU candidate countries. The authors argue that the effect of economic factors is conditional upon exposure to the distributive consequences of EU membership. If citizens do not have much experience with the economic consequences of integration, then human capital (educational attainment, occupational status and income) becomes irrelevant in the formation of EU attitudes. However, this changes when accession negotiations are advanced and the respondent's country's accession is in the foreseeable future. While there is strong evidence for the human capital hypothesis in Western Europe, this is not true for the case of Baltic studies (Ehin, 2001 cited in Elgun and Tillman 2007, 393). A later study re-examined the winner-loser gap in attitudes towards EU membership. It is argued that the size of the gap increases when EU membership becomes credible: "as EU membership becomes more likely and more proximate, it will become increasingly apparent that membership actually represents more than just an entrance to the "West" and will imply a guarantee of new economic realities. That in turn ought to lead the gap

in support between economic winners and losers for EU membership to increase" (Herzog, and Tucker 2009, 8)

Domestic Political Considerations

In contrast to the economic approaches, proxy theories view EU attitudes as a reflection of attitudes towards domestic politics. This perspective can be traced back to Inglehart's (1970) argument that cognitive mobilization helps one to relate to remote roles and situations. According to Inglehart, since European institutions represent something distant, understanding them requires a high level of cognitive mobilization. Subsequently, Jannsen (1991, 467) states that "the issue of integration is too difficult, too abstract or not interesting for an average citizen to form well thought attitudes". He claimed that local politics is easier to understand than national politics because it is not distant. Likewise, national politics is much easier to understand than the EU, which is a supranational entity. Anderson (1998) argues that empirical evidence supports the argument that the public is typically uninformed about the EU. Because of this, it is unrealistic to expect mass publics to show egocentric rationality when the issue is economic benefits to be obtained from EU integration. He argues that citizens need heuristics to compensate for the lack of information. Therefore, they rely on domestic cues when forming their opinions, cues which may come from political institutions, governments and parties. After all, governments of member states participate in EU activities and decision making. The negotiation process is handled by the incumbent government in the candidate countries. Mass media informs the public about the meetings of ministers and heads of government that come together for EU related work. Therefore,

citizens incorporate their opinion of the incumbent government when forming their opinion about the EU.

Following Anderson's lead, scholars (Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2003) took into account the role of evaluation of national politics and institutions in understanding EU support. Following earlier arguments about the impact of cognitive mobilization, they also incorporated knowledge levels into their study. Karp, Banducci, and Bowler (2003, 276) state that if people gain more knowledge of the EU, their evaluations of the EU will be rooted in EU institutions rather than national institutions. The authors find that evaluations of EU performance are more likely to reflect the performance of the national government among low knowledge citizens.

When studying the rising skepticism in EU after the economic crisis of 2007, Armingeon and Ceka (2014) find that the effect of national evaluations becomes less visible for those sophisticated Europeans who are more knowledgeable about the EU. People with a high level of political knowledge do not depend on the national context to form their opinion.

Importantly, even if proxy effects exist, they may not be uniform in all countries. Thus, Tanasouiu and Colonescu's (2008) case study of Bulgaria also show that individuals use domestic cues to evaluate the EU. But in contrast to previous studies, they found that respondents who are dissatisfied with their political leaders' performance tend to be more in favor of EU integration. The authors posit that Bulgarian citizens think that EU membership will put the house in order and correct the government wrongdoing. Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) argue that people are more likely to support EU integration in

countries that have high levels of corruption and have less developed welfare systems. The reason is that "the worse the opinion of the national political system, the lower the opportunity cost of transferring sovereignty to Europe" (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000, 147).

Identity

In addition to economic and domestic political considerations, other factors have been said to shape variation in public support for the EU. These include the "soft predictors" conceptualized by De Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko (2008): identity considerations, fears of symbolic threats to the national community, and anti-immigration sentiments (Hooghe, and Marks 2004; McLaren 2002, 2004)

The European citizenship concept was first introduced with the Maastricht treaty of 1991 that created the European Union, moving the organization beyond economic objectives toward political ambitions. Hooghe and Marks (2004) point out that the European Union connects national and European governments through multilevel governance which pools sovereignty over important aspects of citizens' lives. The "EU is a supranational polity with extensive authority over those living in its territory" (Hooghe, and Marks 2004, 4). In regards to European integration and development of European identity, people feel that their national identity is threatened. Accession negotiations require candidate states to carry out reforms to meet the *acquis communautaire*. The EU reform process clearly has significant consequences for national sovereignty. Because of this, European identity can be seen as an emerging threat to national identity in the EU candidate states. In line with this, Hooghe and Marks (2004) differentiate between exclusive and inclusive identities. The authors posit that individuals with national identity

that is exclusive of other territorial identities will show less support for EU integration than the ones who conceive of their national identity in inclusive terms. The authors state that exclusive identity can easily be mobilized against EU integration by political parties and elites if there is polarization, and if radical right parties are strong.

McLaren (2004) investigates the link between fear of loss of national identity and levels of support for the European integration. She finds that although such fears do have an impact on support for the EU, the impact is not very strong. De Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko (2008) states that people have a tendency to make in-group versus out-group distinctions that are advantageous for their in-group and unfavorable for the out-group. Similar to this argument, Elgun and Tillman (2007) use a variable that measures attitudes toward outside social groups and utilize a questions that ask whether people are disturbed by presence of people of another (1) nationality; (2) race; (3) religion disturbing in your daily life. The authors find that the effect of this variable is substantively large.

Literature on Turkish Public Opinion

After providing a survey of relevant literature in member states and in Central European candidates, it is time to look specifically at how public attitudes toward the EU have been studied in the Turkish context. At first the EU project was seen as an elite project in Turkey (Muftuler-Bac 2005). Consequently, scholars of Turkish politics who were interested in the EU studied Turkish parliamentarians' attitudes rather than public attitudes (Aksit et al. 2011; McLaren 2000; McLaren, and Bac 2003). After the prospect of Turkey's membership became the most contentious debate topic among the public and political elite in Europe, scholars (Lauren 2007; De Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko

2008) began examining the determinants of European public opinion on Turkey's EU accession. Nevertheless, despite the importance of the issue, and despite the availability of good public opinion data since at least 2001, empirical studies of Turkish public opinion were slow to appear. Only in recent years have we seen the emergence of studies that focus on Turkish attitudes toward the EU (Arikan 2012; Carkoglu 2003; Carkoglu, and Kentmen 2011; Jolly, and Oktay 2012; Kentmen 2008; Senyuva 2006; Yilmaz 2011). These studies took into account the history of Turkey-EU relations and characteristics of Turkey while examining the validity of models in the literature. Yet while this new empirical focus represented a step forward, their cumulative results lacked clarity, in part because studies used different datasets, different variables, and different time points, and thus produced different results.

Some scholars (Carkoglu 2003; Carkoglu, and Kentmen 2011; Kentmen 2008) have focused on religion, asking whether it is the main source of Euroscepticism in the Turkish scene. The findings from these studies are contradictory. Kentmen finds that one's devotion to Islam does not affect attitudes toward the West. In a later study, Kentmen and Carkoglu (2011) support the previous finding that the religious practice variable is not significant. However, the authors raise the question of whether results would change if they used multi-dimensional representation of religiosity, as Carkoglu (2003) previously used.

Testing the human capital hypothesis, scholars (Elgun, and Tillman 2007; Kentmen 2008) find that occupation alone does not affect public support. Drawing on Jolly and Brinegar's argument about cross country differences in competitive advantage

of lower skilled workers, Kentmen and Carkoglu (2011) argue that the expectations of labor in Turkey will be different because Turkey is a labor abundant country when compared to Western European countries. Kentmen (2008) finds that unskilled workers support EU integration when they perceive that it will bring benefits to Turkey's economy (2008, 504). According to Kentmen's study, the opportunities for free movement labor do not play a role in opinion formation. However, unskilled workers incorporate their views about the situation of national economy when answering questions about the EU.

Carkoglu and Kentmen (2011) raise the question of whether Turks will relate evaluations of national economic conditions to the EU's impact on the national economy. Turkey has been a Customs Union member since 1995. The authors argue that neither the Customs Union nor the loans received since the Association agreement was signed in 1963 made a significant impact on macroeconomic indicators, in contrast to the experience in other candidate countries. As a result, Carkoglu and Kentmen expect that the effect of national evaluations on EU support might be different than in other candidate countries. However, it is possible that people might think that the adoption of EU reforms brings stability and economic growth. Furthermore, Carkoglu and Kentmen (2011) draw attention to the change in the role of economic evaluations. People who expressed positive evaluations of the economy were more likely to be supportive of membership in 2001-2002, whereas in 2009 they were less likely to be supportive of membership. It is possible that the Turkish economic crisis of 2001 led people see EU reforms as a source of stability, and therefore of prosperity. In later years, this enthusiasm disappears when Turkey experienced a high growth rate of gross domestic product at the

same time that the Eurozone crisis occurred. Jolly and Oktay argue that Turkish economic growth in recent years has contributed to the decreasing levels of public support for EU membership. In their study, Jolly and Oktay (2012, 9) hypothesize that as the Turkish economy improves relative to the EU economy, respondents will be less supportive.

Furthermore, authors (Carkoglu, and Kentmen 2011, 376) draw attention to the reform process which involved democratization efforts to increase minority rights for Kurds. This led to rising partisan cleavages around EU issues coupled with rising nationalist sentiment. As a result, support for the EU declined.

Yilmaz (2011) argues that some of the characteristics of scepticism in Turkey resemble the case of Eastern Europe, where identity Euroscepticism was evident. The issues were not about sharing power with Brussels, "but symbolic ones, such as anthem and flag, that they saw heard and touched in their display Eurosceptic tendencies over the issue of sovereignty" Yilmaz (2011, 15). In the Turkish case, sources of identity Euroscepticism include: fear for loss of national sovereignty, morality, negative discrimination and the Sevres Syndrome. Yilmaz explains that the latter refers to the belief that European states wants to weaken Turkey by supporting ethnic separatism. In a nutshell, the term comes from Treaty of Sevres that involved partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, something that was never realized due to Turkish War of Independence. In a recent study, Arikan (2012) stresses that since most of the accession debate revolves around national identity, variables that measure group interests have high explanatory power. The authors (de Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko 2008; McLaren 2007) who

study European public attitudes toward Turkish membership find that reluctance towards further integration is a function of hostility toward and fear of Turkish culture and fear of immigration. While exploring the other side of the coin which is Turkish public attitudes towards EU, scholars (Arikan 2012; Jolly and Oktay 2012) examine whether the idea of losing cultural identity plays an important role in the formation of public opinion on EU.

A different explanation is offered by Jolly and Oktay (2012, 7) one which takes into account changes in Turkish foreign policy and European Turcoscepticism. The authors argue that both a shift of regional attention in Turkish foreign policy from Europe towards Turkey's neighbors in the Middle East and North Africa, and EU citizens' unwelcoming attitude, have an influence on how Turks feel toward the EU. Carkoglu and Kentmen (2011) found that satisfaction with democracy is positively linked to support for EU membership. Scholars previously talked about the influence of European attitudes towards Turkey's possible accession, especially the negative approaches of European leadership cadres (Yilmaz 2008; Carkoglu, and Kentmen 2011). However, they have not incorporated this into their models up until recently (see Jolly and Oktay, 2012).

In short, while past studies of Turkish public opinion have found support for most of the factors previously linked with attitudes towards EU, there were also findings against the expectations. However, puzzles remain since many studies either focus on a short period of time or use pooled data. We do not know how the effects of variables change over time. Most importantly, do some variables become significant for some years and become insignificant for some years, and for those variables that are

consistently significant over time, are the signs of the coefficient the same for all years? By addressing these questions, this study will take a comprehensive look at the dynamics of Turkish public opinion.

Understanding Evolving Attitudes

In order to fully understand determinants of Turkish public support for the EU, I argue that while building on public opinion literature, we need to take into account the context within which perceptions are shaped. In other words, I agree with authors such as Jolly and Oktay and Yilmaz that we need to understand the context of Turkish politics and economics in order to understand these attitudes. Furthermore, I argue that we need to see this context as a dynamic environment, not a static one. Because of this dynamic quality, it is not only the value of the variables in the model that may change. Instead, the model itself may change, with some variables being more important in one era than in another. Longitudinal study will enable us to investigate the effect of each variable on support for EU membership for each year, and to ask whether there are indeed shifts over time.

The Changing Contexts: External and Internal Influences

Turkey's experience of accession negotiations has been much different than that experienced by most recent candidate countries (with the possible exception of Croatia). In the Turkish case, the open-ended negotiation process has meant that the future of the process cannot be guaranteed. Because prospects of membership are so uncertain, the accession negotiations have essentially demanded concessions from Turkey without giving any assurances of membership. Eralp (2009) defines the negotiating framework

for Turkey as *stricter conditions* and *fewer incentives*. This process entails implementation of reforms in *sensitive* issues to meet the Copenhagen criteria. These areas are: EU's political accession conditionality and Turkey's recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, improvement of minority rights for Kurds, and the curtailment of the military's role in Turkish politics.

The Cyprus problem, the unresolved dispute between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities of the island of Cyprus, came to the forefront during Turkey's accession negotiations. Yilmaz (2011, 9) describes the situation as a serious obstacle towards Turkey's membership. The Republic of Cyprus, which had said "No" to the Annan plan, became a member of the EU and now has veto power that it can exercise over Turkey's accession. Due to custom union obligations, Turkey was required to open its air and sea ports to Greek Cypriot planes and vessels. When Turkey rejected this requirement, the EU Council decided to close eight chapters until Turkey fulfills its commitment related to the Additional Protocol.

The Incumbent AKP

AKP came to power in 2002 and has since won the next two elections. Since 2002, AKP has been in charge of the EU negotiation process. AKP originated from the remnants of the Virtue party (FP), an Islamist political party that sees an unresolvable conflict between Islamic values and Western's values. However, AKP describes itself as a conservative democracy mass party that situates itself at the center of political spectrum. Despite this background, and to many people's surprise, when AKP came to

power, it became an enthusiastic proponent of EU reforms. The infamous remarks of Recep Tayyip Erdogan hint at the underlying intentions behind the democratization goals.

> "Democracy is a means to an end, not the end itself. Democracy is like a train. We shall get out when we arrive at the station we want." (Recep Tayyip Erdogan Interview with Nilgun Cerrahoglu, Milliyet newspaper, 14 July 1996)

No doubt, cooperation between EU and AKP government to decrease the powers of military in Turkish politics raised concerns among the constituents that are not supporters of AKP; this, in turn, has led to a decrease in EU support. It is necessary to mention Ergenekon trial which started in 2008 when journalists and military officers were accused with preparing coup d'Etat against AKP government. The trial was criticized by EU on the grounds that it is being unfair. It was perceived as AKP was trying to contain any opposition. Only when the prime minister and some of the members of his government found themselves in the midst of corruption allegations, Erdogan mentioned that Ergenekon trial was due to the existence of parallel state that planned the entire plot against the military officers and journalists who were defenders of secularism. Yilmaz (2011) draws attention to the decline in support among Republican People's Party (CHP) supporters. At the party level, Celep (2011) argues that the CHP's Euroscepticism results from the party's distrust of the AKP government's honesty and ability to implement the reforms. Muftuler-Bac (2005) states that opposition to the democratization efforts comes from the secular, Kemalist elite as they believe that these reforms will lead to divisive cleavages of Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism.

Economic Growth in Turkey and Economic Crisis in Europe

The changing economic situation both in EU countries and in Turkey also may have shown an impact on Turkish attitudes. Following the economic crisis and the IMF austerity policies, there was a decline in support for the EU member states. The recent great recession in Europe has led to an increase in the number of people who are discontent with policies at both the national and the supranational level. In 2012 large anti-austerity demonstrations took place in Athens, Lisbon and Madrid. When the EU was struggling with its own financial problems, the debt crisis in Greece and in Cyprus was covered by Turkish media. While Europe was experiencing recession, the Turkish economy was performing well. In light of this reversal of economic fortunes, the Turkish political elite did not miss the opportunity to state that the EU needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the EU. Furthermore, the Turkish government utilized the rhetoric of economic stability frequently to counter-attack against the political criticisms it received. Hence, all these developments might make EU less attractive in terms of its economic advantages in the eyes of the public. I expect that public watching the news on European economic crisis encountered with economic growth framing at home will show less enthusiasm towards EU. Thus, in the first decade of the twenty-first century the context of Turkey's EU application changed radically, both in terms of how this issue was treated by domestic political actors, and in terms of the broader economic context in which the negotiations were occurring. These shifting contextual variables are notable, because they tell researchers that our models are not static. Because of these changes, focusing on the variables through time might provide a better understanding of the impact of individual variables.

Hypotheses: Explaining Turkish Public Opinion Support for EU

After having presented the theoretical framework in the previous section, now it is time to introduce the hypotheses that will be tested in the following chapter. Because the Utilitarian perspective has multiple dimensions, it generates four primary hypotheses. As an extension of the traditional economic voting model, I hypothesize that

Hypothesis 1: Respondents who expect that the economy will do better in the coming years will be more supportive of the EU.

Hypothesis 2: Respondents who expect that their personal economic situation will improve in the coming years will be more supportive of the EU.

One aspect of the economic perspective is the insight that individual resources mediate the impact of macro-economic conditions of perceptions of the EU. Thus, the human capital hypothesis says that higher status occupations, educational attainment or levels of income provide opportunities for individuals to deal with the changes introduced by liberalized labor market.

Hypothesis 3: Respondents with a higher level of education will more supportive of the EU.

In formulating the human capital hypothesis, I take into account Seth and Brinegar's argument that people's expectations about the impact of EU integration are affected *not only* by the level of their own skills but also by the skill endowment of that country. Since Turkey is a low skilled country compared to the EU average (Kentmen 2008), I hypothesize that

Hypothesis 4: Manual laborers will be supportive of the EU.

Hypothesis 5: Professional workers will be less supportive of the EU.

Most models of public support for integration include variables related to domestic cues (government, party and system support). Such models assume that people rely on domestic cues due to lack of information when formulating opinion about the EU. It is plausible to assume that people have less information about the EU in candidate countries than in member states. In that case, we expect that domestic cues should play an important role in determining support for EU. I will phrase the hypothesis in line with this statement by Elgun and Tillman (2007, 393) that "since national governments are responsible for negotiating the accession treaty, a citizen who views domestic political processes favorably should be more likely to trust the government to manage this process well."

Hypothesis 6: If the respondent expresses trust in national government, she/he will be more supportive of the EU.

Another proxy is evaluation of national democratic performance. Following Anderson (1998), I will utilize the question about satisfaction with democracy in Turkey as a measure for system support. Unfortunately, this question is not asked in all the surveys. Therefore, I will not be able to incorporate in the baseline model for all years. However, I will test the hypothesis for the years the question is available.

Hypothesis 7: The more satisfied the respondent with how democracy works in the country, the more likely she/he will be supportive of the EU.

The third part of proxy hypothesis is party support. Due to their vote and seat shares, I will be focusing on three parties. Due to data availability, I will be testing this hypothesis

in Chapter 4. Anderson states that traditional categories of partisanship such as left/right cleavage do not perform well when tested for relation with support for EU. Instead, Anderson opts for another dimension which is establishment/new parties where he argues that supporters of antiestablishment parties are less supportive EU project. Taggart and Sczerbiak (2004, 5) argue that "parties that are parties of government or potential parties of government – have high costs associated with expressing any sort of Euroscepticism as it will be these parties that will be directly engaged in negotiating the accession process and because the general consensus around the benefits of EU accession are most strongly represented at the ideological heart of a country's party system". Following the idea that party position is related to level of the Euroscepticism a party adopts, I will take into account whether the party is in the government or in the opposition.

Hypothesis 8: AKP voters will be more likely to support EU membership after their party came to power.

Hypothesis 9: CHP voters will be less likely to support EU membership after AKP came to power and their party is in opposition.

Hypothesis 10: MHP voters will be less likely to support EU membership after AKP came to power and their party is in opposition

Previously, scholars who studied European public opinion and Turkey's accession have identified the fear of weakening of national cultural traditions as another explanation for Euroscepticism. This leads to the social identity hypothesis.

Hypothesis 11: Respondents who relate the EU with loss of cultural identity will be less supportive of the EU.

Another question that I used to measure the effect of national identity on the formation of attitudes asks the respondent how proud he/she is about being Turkish. Similar to the question about satisfaction with democracy, this question is also not available for all years. Still, I will look at its effect for the years the question is asked.

Hypothesis 12: The more proud the respondent is about her/his nationality, the less supportive she/he will be of the EU.

Scholars (Christin 2005; Tverdova and Anderson 2004) underline that the EU represents democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of free markets for the people in Central and Eastern countries and formulate their hypotheses based on the idea that if people are positive about these factors, they will be supportive of the EU also. Because Turkey is still a candidate country with membership not seen in the foreseeable future, people might give importance to the factors that EU stands for while forming their opinion about membership. Therefore, it is worth looking at the effect of these items on support for the EU.

Hypothesis 13: Respondents who relate the EU to economic prosperity will be supportive of the EU.

Hypothesis 14: Respondents who relate the EU to democracy will be supportive of the EU.

Hypothesis 15: Respondents who relate the EU to freedom of movement will be supportive of the EU.

It would be interesting to see the substantive effect of these variables since this can provide information about the priorities among these three for Turkish people. Scholars (Inglehart 1970, Jannsen 1991) identify the EU as something abstract in nature for the average citizen. If European integration is a remote political event, then a high level of cognitive mobilization is required so that one can receive and process messages coming from this distant object. Inglehart (1970, 48) explains his hypothesis in this way: "if the content of the messages concerning Europe were pre-dominantly negative, we would then expect the more educated groups to be more strongly opposed to integration than the less educated. In fact, our impression is that the reverse has been true. Over the last two decades, the topic of European integration has received predominantly favorable coverage in the mass media and schools of Western Europe. National opinion leaders, moreover, (with certain prominent exceptions) have been relatively strong supporters of European integration. Hence, we expect that the more educated groups among the public would not only be more likely to have an opinion concerning European integration; they would also be more likely to have a favorable orientation toward it". Despite the empirical support for the relation between knowledge and attitudes toward EU (Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2003; Tillman 2007) studies on Turkish public opinion have not yet included knowledge factor in their models. In this research, I also incorporated information effect to the model. Results with respect to the hypothesized relationships are robust when I add political knowledge variable.

Studying the Dynamics of Turkish Public Opinion

This chapter formed the theoretical background for my case study and formulated hypotheses. In order to offer a comprehensive picture of Turkish Public opinion towards

the EU, I included many hypotheses to be tested in the following chapter. The following two chapters will test these hypotheses using longitudinal data to see whether changing circumstances change the factors that influence opinion in this area. The basic approach is to construct a baseline model and to observe change over a politically crucial decade in the variables that affect the results. However, the baseline model will not include many variables due to differences in data availability for each year in the study. Because I believe it is still worthwhile to look at the effect of variables even if it is only for some years, I will also construct some models using key variables for which less data is available.

Since I will be examining the effect of the variables on EU support over time, I expect that the magnitude of the effect of variables will vary over time. As explained above, it is also possible that the sign of the coefficients might vary due to changes in contextual factors. This longitudinal approach should show us whether Turkish attitudes towards the EU have followed patterns similar to those in other candidate countries despite big differences in the Turkish accession negotiations. It also should reveal whether domestic political factors or economic conditions have played a bigger role in cooling popular enthusiasm for EU membership.

CHAPTER 3 –
Analysis of Determinants of Turkish Public Support for the EU

This chapter will introduce the dataset, the operationalization of the variables and the methods to study the question. It will be followed by analysis seeking to answer to what degree existing theories explain the Turkish case. After presenting the results of tests of the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2, I will provide the interpretation of results by using simulations.

Introducing the Data

The data used for the following analysis is from Eurobarometer (EB) Surveys conducted between the years 2002-2012. These surveys include Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB) from 2002-2003, and regular Eurobarometer surveys thereafter.[1]The EB survey is conducted twice a year. If questions of interest are available in both waves, both surveys are included for that year.

Each survey is composed of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country. The advantage of using EB surveys is that it provides the researcher the opportunity to compare the Turkish case to other studies in the literature. The available

[1] Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB) 2002.2, September-October 2002; CCEB 2003.4, October-November 2003; EB 62, October-November 2004; EB 64.2, October-November 2005; EB 65.2, March-May 2006; EB 67.2, April-May 2007; EB 69.2, March-May 2008; EB 70.1, October-November 2008; EB 71.3, June-July 2009; EB 72.4, October-November 2009; EB 73.4, May 2010; EB 74.2, November-December 2010; EB 75.3, May 2011; EB 78. 1, November 2012.

questions and control variables are thus identical. Moreover, these questions have been asked with great regularity. In an ideal world, one would use panel data to study changing patterns of Turkish support towards EU, but panel data on this topic is not available for Turkey. Using EB data makes it possible to focus on a time span of 10 years rather than one time point, thus giving leverage to investigate public opinion trends in Turkey.

One of the drawbacks when using surveys that encompass a long period of time is the need to work with questions that are continuously available. This dictates against using questions that are asked in only one or a few of the years. Unfortunately, this includes some questions that would have been of interest, such as satisfaction with democracy or the question about national pride.

Another major limitation with the EB surveys is that they do not regularly ask a question related to party preference. Given the theories about EU attitudes as a proxy for attitudes to domestic politics, it would be interesting to look at the effect of party support on attitudes towards EU. However, the question about vote choice "if there was a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote?" is only asked in CCEB surveys (the earliest surveys in the set). This does not let us observe the changes in attitudes of different party supporters towards EU. In the next chapter I will turn to another data source to investigate the partisan political aspects of attitudes towards the EU. In the current chapter, however, partisan preferences will be excluded because of lack of information about this in the EB.

Changing Turkish Attitudes towards the EU

As Figure 3.1 shows, Turkish opinion about the EU changed significantly over time. In 2002, 67 percent of the Turkish public evaluated EU membership as a good

thing. The EU support reached its peak before the start of accession negotiations. Muftuler-Bac (Europe's world, October 1 2013) describes the scene in Turkey at the start of accession negotiations in this way: "the Turkish mood was celebratory and the future for economic and political developments in Turkey also looked hopeful". Nevertheless, within a year of the start of accession negotiations, we observe a sharp decline in support for EU membership. By 2006, only 44 percent of the Turks were saying that Turkey's EU membership would be a good thing. After a small rise in 2007, the trend is decline in support. By 2012, only 36 percent of the public considered EU membership to be a good thing.

Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the EU would be…?



Figure 3.1 Public Support for the EU, 2002-2012
Source (CCEB 2002 and CCEB 2003, EB 2004-2012)

Carkoglu and Kentmen (2011, 368) state that citizens in candidate countries generally show more support before the start of accession negotiations that later evaporates during the negotiation process. The reason is that, as time passes, a more

informed public becomes disappointed with the fact that there will be inevitable loss of sovereignty, and starts to think how country specific sensibilities would be handled.

The authors underline that the Turkish case is *atypical* because such a drop happened very early in the negotiation stages. However, I think there are similarities in terms of changing patterns of support between the Turkish case and the Polish case. For instance, in his study of Polish public opinion, Sczerbiak (2001) provides information about Polish support for EU membership 1994-1999. "When Poland formally submitted its application in 1994, 77 percent of citizens expressed their support. In 1997, 63 percent of Poles said they would vote yes in a possible referendum whereas in 1999, just one year after opening of negotiations, support declined to 59 percent" (Sczerbiak 2001, 107). I do not have an estimate of support for 1987, the year when Turkey submitted its application. Therefore, I cannot compare whether the support level was similar for both countries after the submission of application. One of the earliest surveys, conducted in 1996, indicates that 55 percent of Turkish public said that in a referendum they would vote in favor of Turkey's membership (Carkoglu, and Kalaycioglu 2011). Compared with the figures from the early 2000s, this suggests that Turkish support may have risen during and after the application and before the negotiations started, but then dropped once serious negotiations were underway. According to Sczerbiak (2001) as the prospect of membership became more realistic during the negotiation process, Poles started to evaluate the costs and benefits of becoming member in terms of socioeconomic factors.

The response shown in Figure 3.1 is to the survey question that is commonly used by researchers to assess a respondent's support for membership. It will be the dependent variable in this chapter's analyses. The question is as follows: "Generally speaking, do

you think your country's membership of the EU would be a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?" Since the answers to this question are ordinal, linear estimation techniques are inappropriate because they make the implicit assumption that the intervals between adjacent categories are equal. Hence, application of maximum likelihood techniques is required. Therefore, when using this data to test hypotheses about the determinants of support for the EU, I will run ordered probit regression. The coefficients for independent variables in an ordered probit model are difficult to interpret, because the substantive significance of the independent variables cannot be determined by comparing the size of the coefficients. When interpreting the results I will therefore use the software program Clarify to estimate the effect of change in the variables of interest on the probability of saying EU membership is a good thing. Clarify is a program that uses stochastic simulation techniques to produce quantities of interest such as predicted values, expected values or first differences so that researchers can provide substantive interpretation to their results (King , Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000, 360).

In the next section, I will start with a focus on the last data point in my study, which is the year 2012. This is the most recent Eurobarometer data, and it thus provides the most current snapshot of Turkish attitudes towards the EU from this source. It will be followed by another section investigating changes in Turkish attitudes towards the EU over time.

Explaining Public Opinion in 2012

In the sections that follow, I will use the EB data to try to explain the determinants of EU support in Turkey in the year 2012.

I will test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2, asking whether Turkish attitudes have been formed by the same pressures as have been found in other candidate countries, and asking whether a single model can be used to explain support over the course of a decade which saw big changes in the context of the EU debates. Table 3.1 presents a summary of those hypotheses, shows the EB variables that will be used to test each hypothesis, and presents the expected direction of the relationship.

Table 3.1 Hypotheses about public support for EU membership

Factors		Hypothesis Tested	Wording of Question	Coding	Expected Effect
Economic	Sociotropic Evaluations	Hypothesis I	What are the expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the economic situation in our country?	Worse=1; Same=2; Better=3	Positive
	Egocentric Evaluations	Hypothesis 2	What are the expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the financial situation of your household?	Worse=1; Same=2; Better=3	Positive
	Education	Hypothesis 3	How old were you when you stopped full time education?	Respondents who left school at age 15 or younger (1); Respondents who left school at ages 16 to 19 (2); Respondents who stayed in school until they were aged 20 or older Respondent who are still studying and they are aged 20 or older (3)	Positive
	Manual Worker	Hypothesis 4	What is your current occupation?	Manual worker=1; Otherwise=0	Positive
	Professional Worker	Hypothesis 5	What is your current occupation?	Professional=1; Otherwise=0	Negative
Political	Government Support	Hypothesis 6	I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? The government	Tend to trust=1; Tend not to trust=0	Positive
	System Support	Hypothesis 7	On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in our country?	Not at all Satisfied=1; Not very Satisfied=2; Fairly Satisfied=3; Very Satisfied=4	Positive
	Party Support AKP	Hypothesis 8	Vote intentions next national elections	AKP=1; Otherwise=0	Positive
	Party Support CHP	Hypothesis 9	Vote intentions next national elections	CHP=1; Otherwise=0	Negative
	Party Support MHP	Hypothesis 10	Vote intentions next national elections	MHP=1; Otherwise=0	Negative
Identity	Loss of Cultural Identity	Hypothesis 11	What does European Union mean personally?	Loss of Cultural Identity=1; Otherwise=0	Negative
	Proud of National Identity	Hypothesis 12	Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be Turkish?	Not at all=1; Not very proud=2; Fairly proud=3; Very proud=4	Negative
	Economic Prosperity	Hypothesis 13	What does European Union mean personally?	Economic Prosperity=1; Otherwise=0	Positive
	Democracy	Hypothesis 14	What does European Union mean personally?	Democracy=1; Otherwise=0	Positive
	Freedom of Movement	Hypothesis 15	What does European Union mean personally?	Freedom of Movement=1; Otherwise=0	Positive

Building on the previous studies that were described in Chapter 2, the baseline model for all of my analyses is based on three main theoretical approaches that put the emphasis on the role of economic calculations (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998), political cues (Anderson 1998) and cultural threat and identity (McLaren 2002; Hooghe, and Marks 2004). While these theories tap into different aspects of integration, together they can offer a comprehensive framework to study public opinion towards EU. The main independent variables include prospective sociotropic evaluations, prospective egocentric evaluations, trust in government, EU meaning as loss of cultural identity, occupational groups and education. In keeping with other studies in this area (Herzog, and Tucker 2009; McLaren 2005; Tverdova, and Anderson 2004), I have included gender and age as controls in the analyses. However, for the sake of presentational simplicity I do not present the coefficients for gender and age in the tables since these variables are not directly related to the theories that are being tested here.

Economic evaluations regarding the national economy and personal financial situation are measured by using the following questions:

"What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the economic situation in our country?"

"What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the financial situation of your household?"

Answers are recoded as Worse (1) Same (2) and Better (3). The variable "trust in government" is a binary variable. "Loss of cultural identity" is also a binary variable. If

the respondent chose this item when asked about the meaning of EU personally, it is coded as 1; otherwise it is zero. Occupation is measured using two dummy variables: manual workers and professionals. The base category is unemployed, house person, student and retired. Education, an ordinal variable, is based on the question about the age at which respondents stopped full time education. There are three categories: 15 or younger, 16 to 19, and 20 or older. Following Hakhverdian et al. (2013), I coded the respondents who stated they are still studying based on their age. If the respondent is 20 years old or older, he/she is assigned to the group 20 or older. I excluded the small number of respondents who are still studying and who are younger than 20.

The first column of Table 3.2, reports the coefficients for baseline model of determinants of Turkish public support for the EU for the year 2012. Using CLARIFY, I calculated first differences. Table 3.7 shows the results of change in predicted probabilities for a respondent evaluating EU membership as a good thing if the variable of interest is moved from its minimum value to its maximum value while all other variables are set to its mean values.

Drawing on the economy voting theory, Hypothesis 1 in Chapter 2 asserted that respondents who expect that the economy will do better in the coming years will be more supportive of the EU. Hypothesis 2 asserted that respondents who expect that their personal economic situation will improve in the coming years will be more supportive of the EU. This analysis of Turkish attitudes towards the EU in 2012 only partly confirms these expectations. The results show that both sociotropic and egocentric expectations do play a role in the formation of attitudes towards EU, but not necessarily in the expected way. Previous studies of both candidate and member countries have shown that when

people are optimistic about national economic conditions, they are more likely to support the EU. In contrast to these earlier studies, Table 3.2 shows a negative sign for the coefficient for prospective national economic expectations, meaning that in 2012, Turkish citizens who were optimistic about national economic conditions were less likely to say that the EU is a good thing. It is important to note that the p-value associated with this variable is 0.056, or just slightly above traditional thresholds of statistical significance. This necessitates further analysis to understand whether the trend in the following years will also have negative sign and be statistically significant. The change in the probability of observing the outcome Y=3 (EU membership is a good thing) when the independent variable sociotropic expectations move from worse to better holding all others at its mean is 0.10. This effect is less than what we observed for some years but it is still not a small effect.

The 2012 results in Table 3.2 provide more support for the egocentric support hypothesis. As expected, it shows that when people evaluate their financial situation positively, they are more likely to say EU membership is a good thing. The effect of the egocentric expectations variable is substantively large, with a value of 0.22.

Hypotheses 3 through 5 relate personal resources to EU attitudes. One of these resources is education. The prediction of Hypothesis 3 is that higher education levels will be associated with more positive support for the EU, because those with the most education potentially have the most to gain from the changes. In 2012, the education variable is statistically significant; however, contrary to predictions it has a negative sign. As the level of education increases, Turkish respondents were less likely to say EU membership is a good thing.

Furthermore, both of the occupational groups have a negative sign, although only the manual worker variable is statistically significant. If the respondent is manual worker, he/she is less likely to say EU membership is a good thing. This is contrary to our expectation as Hypothesis 4 stated that manual workers would express more support because Turkey is a labor abundant country, and manual workers would benefit from EU opportunities to find employment in higher-wage states.

Following Anderson's proxy theory of support for integration, Hypothesis 6 predicts that if the respondent expresses trust in national government, she/he will be more supportive of the EU. However, Table 3.2 shows us that in this model the trust in government variable is not significant. It is puzzling that we do not observe a significant relationship. Based on past research from other candidate countries, we would expect Turkish publics to depend on proxies such as attitudes towards national political institutions when forming their opinion. This relationship was not evident in Turkey in 2012. A subsequent section will investigate whether this is a new or a long term development, looking at the relation between trust in government and EU support over time.

Hypothesis 11 posits that respondents' national identity is a source of public opinion towards the EU (Hooghe, and Marks 2004). Unfortunately, this is hard to directly test with EB data in a longitudinal analysis because questions that ask directly about national identity are not continuously asked in all surveys. Questions that are asked only occasionally include "strength of attachment to one's country", "strength of national pride" and "the notion of national identity in inclusive versus exclusive terms". However, we can test it using a close proxy. The impact of fear of losing cultural identity

on support for European integration project was first investigated by McLaren (2004). Similar to other scholars (Arikan 2013; Jolly, and Oktay 2012), I utilized the question that asks the meaning of EU personally to the respondents and provides response items one of which is loss of cultural identity. The advantage of using this question is it is available in all surveys. Table 3.2 shows that in 2012 the variable "Loss of cultural identity" is statistically significant for explaining EU attitudes, and it has a negative sign. People who associate the EU with loss of cultural identity are less likely to support EU membership. This finding is in line with the finding of previous studies (McLaren 2007). Moreover, calculating predicted probabilities shows that its substantive effect is large compared to other variables. If the respondent identifies the EU with the loss of cultural identity, the change in the predicted probability of expressing EU support is - 0.20, holding all other variables at its mean.

Table 3.2, column 2 re-estimates the model for 2012 with three additional dummy variables. In Chapter 2, I argued that since Turkey is a candidate country and EU membership is not in the foreseeable future, the Turkish public might evaluate the EU in terms of their own notions of what the EU stands for. Hence, I identified the most frequently selected response items to the question "What does EU mean to you personally?" These items were: democracy, economic prosperity and freedom of movement. The other items that are not utilized are: peace, social protection, cultural diversity, stronger say in the world, Euro, bureaucracy, waste of money, more crime, not enough control at external frontiers.[2]

The results of the model in column 2 show that people who associate the EU with economic prosperity are more likely to say that the EU is a good thing. Respondents who

[2] I identified these items based on their frequency

selected the item "the EU means freedom to travel, work and study in anywhere in Europe" are also more likely to support EU. On the other hand, when these variables are included, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is a relation between people's identification of EU with democracy and attitudes towards EU. This is contrary to our expectations and needs further exploration. The substantive effects of these definitional variables can shed light on the degree of importance attached by the respondents when forming their opinion about the EU. In that case, predicted values show that associating the EU with economic prosperity has the most impact, with a value of 0.29, followed by associating the EU with a loss of cultural identity, which has a value of -0.16. The freedom of movement variable has a value of 0.09.

The preceding analysis gives a snapshot of Turkish public opinion towards the EU in 2012. The results show that Turkish attitudes have largely responded to the same forces that have shaped opinion in other candidate countries. However, there are some notable exceptions to this generalization, including the negative relation between education and EU attitudes, and manual worker and EU attitudes. While human capital variables; education and manual worker are not in the expected direction, they do play a role in the formation attitudes. In the case of previous candidate countries, the impact of human capital variables on attitudes was not consistently supported by the data. A noneconomic factor, identity is important in explaining attitudes towards EU. This is similar to findings from studies of previous candidate countries. In contrast to expectations, attitudes towards domestic political institution is not are good predictors of support, while economic evaluations--which require some level of cognitive mobilization--are utilized by Turkish public when answering questions about the EU.

The question explored in the next section is whether these relationships have been stable over time, or whether the determinants of EU attitudes have shifted over time as a result of contextual factors, including the shifting economic landscape and the shifting climate of accession negotiations. Put differently, can the decline in public support for the EU, shown in Figure 3.1, be explained by shifting values in the independent variables that are important in Table 3.2, or has the model itself changed over time?

Exploring Changes in Turkish Attitudes towards the EU Over Time

In order to study the shifting climate of Turkish public opinion towards the EU, Table 3.3 provides the results of an ordered probit regression analysis for each year during the time period of 2002-2012. Focusing on a long time period will provide us information about whether the determinants of Turkish attitudes towards the EU have been consistent, or whether they have changed over time.

Economic Considerations

One of the surprising findings in the 2012 data was that economic evaluations regarding the national economy had a negative impact on EU evaluations. Table 3.3 shows that this finding is relatively new in Turkey. In earlier years the relation was positive and statistically significant (e.g., 2003, 2004, 2005, 2009), as predicted by Hypothesis 1 and by much research from other countries, or else the relationship was not statistically significant. In other words, these findings suggest a big shift in the decade in the way that opinions about the national economy influence Turkish thinking about whether EU membership would be a good thing. Similar findings were presented by

Carkoglu and Kentmen (2011) though these scholars found that economic evaluations changed character in 2009.

Egocentric economic evaluations are significant for the years 2003, 2004, 2006, 2011 and 2012. They are also in the expected direction, supporting our hypothesis that says that a respondent who evaluate that his/her financial situation of the household will get better in the coming years, will be more likely to support EU. This stability is in contrast to the flip in the impact of sociotropic evaluations.

Domestic Political Considerations

Trust in government is most of the time period statistically significant except a few years; 2003, 2004 and 2012, as previously mentioned. The results suggest that respondents who indicate support for the incumbent government are more likely to support membership for the EU. This finding supports the hypothesis that citizens will use proxies to evaluate the EU, particularly in candidate countries in which citizens have relatively little information about the EU. No doubt, the most important interpreter of what the EU stands for is the government, which is the chief negotiator with the EU. Since AKP is the ruling party since 2002, trust in government also meant trust in AKP. In 2012, it is possible that as AKP government lost its zeal for the EU, the link between government support and EU support also blurred. I will explore the impact of partisan political support further in Chapter 4.

Human Capital

Previously, I mentioned that the education variable had a negative sign and was statistically significant for the year 2012. It is not possible to talk about the same relation between level of education and EU support during the earlier years. In 2002, the finding

supports the hypothesis that as education level increases, respondents become more likely to express positive thoughts about EU membership. However, we do not see any significant relationship in between 2002 and 2012.

Most of the time, we do not observe a significant relationship between the two occupational groups and evaluations of EU. Since Turkey is relatively abundant in low skilled labour, we would expect that manual workers would be more likely to be in favor of Turkey's EU membership (Hypothesis 4). Only in 2007 do we find support for this hypothesis that manual workers are more likely to support EU membership. However, in 2012, we find that the variable is statistically significant but the sign of the coefficient is in the opposite direction. In other words, the results show that manual workers were never more likely to say that EU membership is a good thing.

Identity

The variable loss of cultural identity is consistently significant and has a negative sign in all the years with the exception of year 2005, when EU opened accession negotiations with Turkey. In 2005, the variable is not statistically significant. The table 3.7 shows that this variable's effect is substantively large compared to the effect of other variables.

EU meaning

Table 3.4 provides results for the ordered probit model where I explore the effect of EU meaning questions in addition to baseline variables for the years between 2002 and 2012. Previously, I mentioned that economic prosperity has a big substantive effect for the year 2012. A look at the past decade shows that economic prosperity variable is consistently positive and statistically significant. When the value of the variable is

changed from 0 to 1 while keeping all other variables at its mean value, the change in predicted probability of a respondent saying that the EU is a good thing is consistently large over the years. It is important to note that the impact of this variable is lowest in 2002, when the change in predicted probability caused by this variable is only 10 %, much lower than in following years. This could be related to the economic crisis of 2001, but I suspect that this is actually related to a slight difference in the question wording used in this year. Unfortunately, the item list regarding the question about the meaning of the EU in the 2002 CEEB survey is slightly different than other surveys utilized in this study. Respondents were asked to choose the statement that best describes what EU means to them personally. The 2002 survey includes this statement "A means of improving the Economic situation in the European Union". However, in all other years this option is phrased more simply as "economic prosperity". In contrast, in 2003 the calculation of first differences results in value of 0.36 for this variable. This variable has a strong effect on the dependent variable and this is consistent over the years.

In the 2002 and 2003 CEEB surveys, the EU meaning question did not include the item "democracy". Therefore I utilized the item "A way to protect the rights of citizens" as a proxy for evaluating the attitudinal effect of the perception that the EU stands for democracy, since the rule of law in democracies guarantee the protection of citizen rights. The respondents who associate EU with democracy are more likely to say the EU is a good thing. This variable is statistically significant and positive between 2002 and 2010. Yet this, too, seems to change over time. In 2011 and 2012, the variable is no longer statistically significant, and we no longer find support for the hypothesis that EU meaning as a democracy has an impact on the formation of attitudes towards the EU. In contrast,

the variable "EU meaning as free movement of travel, work and study anywhere in the union" is statistically significant and its effect is consistent over time. Yet here too, we see some change in the model. One year after the beginning of accession negotiations, in 2006, this variable has a large substantive impact with a value of 0.26 on the predicted probability when its value changed from 0 to 1 holding all other variables at its mean. As time passes, the effect decreases.

System Support

Table 3.5 provides the results of ordered probit regression when the satisfaction with democracy variable is added to the baseline model. Although this question is not available for all the years, it is available for most of them. I tried to look at its effect on the formation Turkish attitudes towards the EU whenever (years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2010) the question was asked. In doing so, I am following Anderson (1998), who uses satisfaction with the way democracy works as an indicator of system support. The question is as follows "On the whole are you (very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, not at all satisfied) with the way democracy works in (Our Country)?" Similar to evaluating the impact of trust in government, using this variable moves the research beyond emphasizing only economic calculations when studying public opinion about EU. However, a look at the results shows that only in 2002 did satisfaction with democracy have a statistically significant impact on Turkish attitudes towards the EU. In that year the relationship was positive, meaning the more respondents are satisfied with democracy in Turkey, the more likely they were to say that the EU is a good thing. It is possible that the reason this relationship was found only early in the process was because that was when the EU was putting most pressure on Turkey to adopt institutional changes that

strengthened democracy. Kalaycioglu (2011) describes the high number of constitutional amendments that took place in 2001 as part of Turkish efforts to improve Turkish democracy in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. It is possible that these attempts to promote democracy were linked to EU membership by the public. However, this explanation is not entirely satisfying, because in later years, this variable is not significant, even though the government continued to introduce constitutional amendments that also responded to EU pressures.

Kalaycioglu (2011) differentiates democratization attempts into two periods in terms of the way they were handled in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. According to Kalaycioglu, from 1993 to 2002 all major parties work together through deliberation and compromise to pass the constitutional amendments that promoted political liberties and rights. "A second period seems to have started in 2002, in which constitutional amendments were presented as the partisan accomplishment of the AKP" (Kalaycioglu 2011, 276). It is possible to articulate that democratization efforts at first were welcomed with enthusiasm. However, over time this enthusiasm faded away. In the later period, it is possible that public opinion did not link democratization efforts with the EU influence due to the AKP's role as the initiator of all the changes. For instance, the issue of Kurdish rights under the heading of improvement in the situation of minority rights is viewed as a threat to national unity. Yilmaz (2011, 196) states that the CHP leaders argued that "the AKP has abused the EU-related democratic reforms to 'soften' the military and other forces of the secularist establishment, thereby clearing the ground to realise their final goal of putting an end to the secular order and Islamicising the Turkish

state and society." Chapter 4 will use other data to try to disentangle the impact of party support and support for democracy on attitudes towards the EU.

Table 3.6 provides the results of ordered probit regression where I added the pride in nationality variable to the baseline model. This question is included in the surveys for some years (2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005). This question might provide a better measure of identity effect than threat to cultural identity question. However, it is not asked after 2005. Still, I wanted to investigate its effects for those years. The question is as follows "Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, and not at all proud to be (NATIONALITY)? Very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud" The variable is statistically significant in 2004 and has the expected sign, meaning the more respondent is proud of being Turkish, the less likely he/she is to say membership in the EU is a good thing. When we change the value of this variable from minimum to maximum, it has an impact of 18 percent on the dependent variable while holding all other variables in its mean. Furthermore, incorporating this variable to the baseline model did not lead any changes in the variable "Loss of Cultural Identity"

Explaining the Longitudinal Changes In the Model

Looking at a period of ten years shows that the effect of variables changed over time. Overall, economic factors seem to play an important role in the formation of attitudes towards EU. The results suggest that people utilize their evaluations regarding the economic situation in Turkey and the financial situation of their household when asked about their opinion on EU membership. Up until 2009, people who expect that national economic situation will get better were more likely to say that the EU is a good thing. After this, the results suggest that the impact of economic evaluations might have

changed. In 2011 and 2012, people who expect that national economic situation will get better were no more likely to say EU is a good thing. This can be due to changing circumstances both in Turkey and the European Union. I referred to the Eurozone crisis in Chapter 2. When the EU was struggling with its own financial problems, the debt crisis in Greece and in Cyprus was covered by the Turkish media. From 2009-2012, while Europe was experiencing a recession, the Turkish economy was relatively strong. In this period the Turkish political elite seldom missed an opportunity to state that the EU needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the EU. Furthermore, former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ministers frequently used the rhetoric of economic stability and growth during their government. Jolly and Oktay (2012, 9) state that "positive developments in the Turkish economy since 2002 compel us to think that the EU's economic appeal may begin to fade as the country begins to gain economic strength without the EU anchor". Although we see a decline in Turkish economic growth around the time of the global economic crisis in 2009, as Jolly and Oktay (2012, 10) say "the country was able to maneuver its way out of the crisis without major damages". The authors include the Turkish GDP per capita/EU exports ratio in their model to look at the effect of economy on attitudes. They found that as GDP per capital relative to EU GDP per capita increases, Turkish public support for the EU decreases.

To explore the impact of economic changes on how Turkish citizens evaluate EU membership, I will look at the impact of GDP growth rate in Turkey in the formation of attitudes towards EU. In order to do this, I will estimate multilevel mixed effects ordered logistic regression, using economic variable at the country level alongside individual-

level variables. The annual percentage growth rate of GDP is taken from World Bank data.

The reason, I chose to estimate this model is that I can present the results in terms of odds ratios. Odds ratios are commonly used in survey research as they provide substantively meaningful interpretation of results. The dependent variable and all other variables from the baseline model are same. I will be adding only annual GDP growth rate to the model.

Figure 3.2 clearly shows how Turkey was affected by the global economic crisis of 2009. However, after a sharp decline in GDP growth rate in 2009, we see that Turkey was able to position itself better than the Eurozone countries.

Annual GDP Growth Rate



Figure 3.2 Comparison of GDP growth rate for Turkey and Euro 18
Source: the Worldbank, Eurostat

Table 3.8 presents the results of multi-level mixed effects ordinal logistic regression. The variable GDP growth rate has an odds ratio of .991 with p value of 0.037 which means that when the Turkish economy does well, it becomes less likely that people will support EU membership. This finding supports our expectation that as the Turkish economy has developed; the European Union's appeal in terms of economic prosperity has faded in the eyes of public.

Highlights of Main Findings

Most of the time--except the year 2012-- the trust in government variable is statistically significant, suggesting that government support as a proxy plays an important role in terms of explaining Turkish public opinion towards EU. Another proxy system support variable, measured as satisfaction with democracy, does not perform as well as in the case of Bulgaria. It is possible to speculate that in the beginning of the decade democratic reforms were welcomed by many and passed in the parliament by coalition governments through negotiations. Hence, the link between EU support and satisfaction with democracy was established in the eyes of the public. However, over time the link between the two became irrelevant.

The effect of economic evaluations is not uniform over time. At first, the relationship between prospective economic evaluations and EU support was positive. Later we witness the changing nature of this trend.

The variable "loss of cultural identity" is consistently significant and has a negative impact on the dependent variable. While this result was expected, it is important to note that its impact is substantively large.

Occupational groups do not have much explanatory power. It might be that since Turkish membership to EU is not seen credible, we do not see the relation between interest calculations and opinion formation. It is interesting to note that at the end of the time period of this study, we see that manual workers became less likely to support EU membership whereas in 2007, manual workers were more likely to say EU membership is a good thing.

Furthermore, in 2012 the results show that as the education level increases, people become less likely to support EU membership. However, in the beginning of the data series, in 2002, the education variable was in the expected direction. Overall, the findings suggest that different segments of society become less likely to evaluate EU membership as a good thing in 2012.

The next chapter will explore the unexplained part of the puzzle, the impact of political affiliations. So far we looked only at the effect of government support and system support rather than directly measuring partisan impacts, since Eurobarometer surveys after year 2003 did not have question about vote intentions. That is why Chapter 4 will turn to other data that can help unravel this.

Table 3.2 Ordered Probit Models of Turkish Public Support for the EU in 2012

	Model 1		Model 2	
Prospective Sociotopic	**-0.137**	*	**-0.133**	
	0.072		0.072	
Prospective Egocentric	**0.288**	***	**0.28**	***
	0.076		0.077	
Trust Government	**0.14**		**0.078**	
	0.1		0.101	
Loss of Cultural Identity	**-0.555**	***	**-0.436**	***
	0.112		0.115	
Education	**-0.208**	**	**-0.232**	***
	0.066		0.067	
Manual Worker	**-0.356**	*	**-0.49**	***
	0.144		0.148	
Professional	**-0.103**		**-0.179**	
	0.119		0.121	
Economic Prosperity			**0.758**	***
			0.105	
Free Movement			**0.24**	*
			0.112	
Democracy			**0.151**	
			0.122	
cut1				
_cons	**-0.969**	***	**-0.718**	*
	0.278		0.286	
cut2				
_cons	**-0.376**		**-0.08**	
	0.277		0.285	
chi2	66.5	***	133	***
Log Likelihood	-666.7		-633.59	
Pseudo R square	0.05		0.09	
Number of Obs.	657		657	

Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients and displays standard errors under the coefficients.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 3.3a Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU, 2002-2006

	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006	
Prospective Sociotopic	**0.026**		**0.248**	***	**0.229**	***	**0.337**	***	**0.115**	
	0.071		0.072		0.052		0.087		0.076	
Prospective Egocentric	**0.043**		**0.164**	*	**0.122**	*	**0.032**		**0.237**	**
	0.075		0.078		0.057		0.093		0.083	
Trust Government	**0.34**	***	**-0.111**		**0.114**		**0.457**	***	**0.43**	***
	0.095		0.103		0.082		0.119		0.11	
Loss of Cultural Identity	**-0.656**	***	**-0.78**	***	**-0.684**	***	**0.22**		**-0.772**	***
	0.094		0.095		0.078		0.136		0.119	
Education	**0.179**	**	**0.077**		**-0.044**		**0.056**		**0.093**	
	0.065		0.068		0.047		0.07		0.072	
Manual Worker	**-0.063**		**-0.051**		**0.016**		**0.174**		**-0.047**	
	0.171		0.144		0.113		0.164		0.153	
Professional	**-0.105**		**0.109**		**-0.111**		**-0.083**		**-0.09**	
	0.118		0.119		0.087		0.142		0.129	
cut1										
_cons	-0.905	***	-0.666	*	-1.08	***	0.121		0.186	
	0.245		0.264		0.189		0.281		0.27	
cut2										
_cons	-0.241		0.05		-0.349		0.812	**	0.925	***
	0.243		0.263		0.187		0.282		0.272	
chi2	72	***	110	***	167	***	83.5	***	99.1	***
Log Likelihood	-615.5		-611.3		-1144		-490.4		-613	
Pseudo R square	0.06		0.08		0.07		0.08		0.07	
Number of Obs.	784		822		1542		565		635	

Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients and displays standard errors under the coefficients.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 3.3b Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU, 2007-2012 (continued)

	2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
Prospective Sociotopic	**0.067**		**0.092**		**0.182**	***	**0.036**		**-0.133**		**-0.137**	*
	0.07		0.058		0.05		0.056		0.075		0.072	
Prospective Egocentric	**0.047**		**0.039**		**0.012**		**-0.011**		**0.171**	*	**0.288**	***
	0.081		0.054		0.053		0.06		0.071		0.076	
Trust Government	**0.344**	**	**0.327**	***	**0.195**	**	**0.455**	***	**0.451**	***	**0.14**	
	0.113		0.07		0.068		0.072		0.106		0.1	
Loss of Cultural Identity	**-0.863**	***	**-0.866**	***	**-0.755**	***	**-0.875**	***	**-0.576**	***	**-0.555**	***
	0.118		0.086		0.088		0.082		0.11		0.112	
Education	**-0.063**		**0.065**		**0.029**		**-0.051**		**0.026**		**-0.208**	**
	0.07		0.045		0.044		0.048		0.062		0.066	
Manual Worker	**0.349**	*	**-0.106**		**0.058**		**0.034**		**-0.172**		**-0.356**	*
	0.163		0.097		0.094		0.104		0.139		0.144	
Professional	**-0.016**		**0.004**		**-0.015**		**-0.039**		**-0.132**		**-0.103**	
	0.124		0.084		0.086		0.088		0.126		0.119	
cut1												
_cons	-0.463		-0.305		-0.172		-0.61	**	-0.476		-0.969	***
	0.28		0.173		0.164		0.189		0.261		0.278	
cut2												
_cons	0.072		0.264		0.379	*	-0.131		0.12		-0.376	
	0.279		0.173		0.164		0.188		0.261		0.277	
chi2	83.9	***	156	***	123	***	193	***	64	***	66.5	***
Log Likelihood	-583.4		-1294		-1379		-1246		-687.5		-666.7	
Pseudo R square	0.07		0.06		0.04		0.07		0.04		0.05	
Number of Obs.	639		1339		1400		1335		681		657	

Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients and displays standard errors under the coefficients.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 3.4a Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: the Role of EU's Meaning, 2002-2006

	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006	
Prospective Sociotropic	**0.038**		**0.18**	*	**0.19**	***	**0.299**	***	**0.104**	
	0.075		0.077		0.054		0.089		0.077	
Prospective Egocentric	**0.027**		**0.171**	*	**0.082**		**-0.002**		**0.164**	
	0.079		0.083		0.059		0.095		0.086	
Trust Government	**0.248**	*	**-0.15**		**0.195**	*	**0.387**	**	**0.394**	***
	0.101		0.109		0.086		0.122		0.112	
Loss of Cultural Identity	**-0.79**	***	**-0.74**	***	**-0.62**	***	**0.109**		**-0.56**	***
	0.102		0.102		0.082		0.143		0.126	
Economic Prosperity	**0.277**	*	**1.05**	***	**0.719**	***	**0.661**	***	**0.527**	***
	0.11		0.102		0.073		0.117		0.106	
Free Movement	**0.414**	***	**0.645**	***	**0.279**	***	**0.37**	**	**0.662**	***
	0.115		0.105		0.074		0.124		0.141	
Democracy	**0.827**	***			**0.484**	***	**0.517**	***	**0.553**	***
	0.112				0.083		0.151		0.13	
Education	**0.105**		**0.048**		**-0.05**		**0.038**		**0.044**	
	0.069		0.073		0.049		0.073		0.074	
Manual Worker	**-0.08**		**0.048**		**0.024**		**0.059**		**-0.05**	
	0.183		0.152		0.117		0.17		0.156	
Professional	**-0.09**		**0.207**		**-0.06**		**-0.05**		**-0.13**	
	0.126		0.129		0.091		0.147		0.132	
cut1										
_cons	**-0.3**		**0.072**		**-0.63**	**	**0.266**		**0.304**	
	0.263		0.29		0.2		0.291		0.277	
cut2										
_cons	0.495		0.966	***	0.2	***	1.02	***	1.12	
	0.263		0.291		0.2		0.292		0.28	
chi2	226		298		368		150		180	
Log Likelihood	-539		-517		-1043		-457		-572	
Pseudo R square	0.17		0.22		0.15		0.14		0.14	
Number of Obs.	784		822		1542		565		635	

Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients and displays standard errors under the coefficients. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 3.4b Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: the Role of EU's Meaning, 2007-2012 (continued)

	2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
Prospective Sociotropic	**0.04**		**0.079**		**0.231**	***	**0.036**		**-0.125**		**-0.133**	
	0.071		0.059		0.051		0.058		0.076		0.072	
Prospective Egocentric	**0.054**		**0.053**		**-0.052**		**-0.012**		**0.168**	*	**0.28**	***
	0.083		0.056		0.054		0.061		0.072		0.077	
Trust Government	**0.348**	***	**0.337**	***	**0.168**	*	**0.436**	***	**0.428**	***	**0.078**	
	0.116		0.072		0.069		0.074		0.107		0.101	
Loss of Cultural Identity	**-0.787**	***	**-0.658**	***	**-0.469**	***	**-0.734**	***	**-0.477**	***	**-0.436**	***
	0.122		0.089		0.092		0.084		0.112		0.115	
Economic Prosperity	**0.762**	***	**0.758**	***	**0.804**	***	**0.768**	***	**0.419**	***	**0.758**	***
	0.112		0.072		0.073		0.073		0.101		0.105	
Free Movement	**0.349**	***	**0.482**	***	**0.156**	*	**0.464**	***	**0.266**		**0.24**	*
	0.11		0.078		0.072		0.081		0.108		0.112	
Democracy	**0.382**	**	**0.489**	***	**0.459**	***	**0.363**	***	**0.152**		**0.151**	
	0.144		0.09		0.087		0.085		0.116		0.122	
Education	**-0.085**		**0.066**		**0.005**		**-0.051**		**0.013**		**-0.232**	***
	0.072		0.047		0.045		0.049		0.063		0.067	
Manual Worker	**0.369**	*	**-0.117**		**0.1**		**0.017**		**-0.187**		**-0.49**	***
	0.168		0.1		0.096		0.107		0.14		0.148	
Professional	**-0.064**		**0.047**		**-0.006**		**-0.035**		**-0.089**		**-0.179**	
	0.127		0.086		0.088		0.091		0.127		0.121	
cut1												
_cons	**-0.183**		**0.23**		**0.156**		**-0.175**		**-0.192**		**-0.718**	*
	0.29		0.183		0.171		0.198		0.269		0.286	
cut2												
_cons	0.4		0.863	***	0.753	***	0.354		0.421		-0.08	
	0.291		0.184		0.171		0.198		0.269		0.285	
chi2	153		347		283		371		93		133	
Log Likelihood	-548.8		-1199.2		-1299.5		-1157.3		-672.97		-633.59	
Pseudo R square	0.12		0.13		0.10		0.14		0.06		0.09	
Number of Obs.	639		1339		1400		1335		681		657	

Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients and displays standard errors under the coefficients.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 3.5 Ordered Probit Model of Turkish Support for the EU: the Role of Satisfaction with Democracy in Turkey

	2002		2003		2004		2006		2009		2010	
Prospective Sociotropic	**0.005**		**0.247**	***	**0.236**	***	**0.107**		**0.184**	*	**0.109**	
	0.072		0.073		0.053		0.078		0.073		0.081	
Prospective Egocentric	**0.04**		**0.167**	*	**0.128**	*	**0.213**	*	**0.069**		**-0.12**	
	0.075		0.079		0.058		0.085		0.077		0.087	
Trust Government	**0.247**	*	**-0.09**		**0.124**		**0.393**	***	**0.142**		**0.304**	**
	0.098		0.104		0.085		0.116		0.097		0.11	
Loss of Cultural Identity	**-0.66**	***	**-0.77**	***	**-0.68**	***	**-0.8**	***	**-0.77**	***	**-1.13**	***
	0.095		0.095		0.079		0.122		0.132		0.126	
Satisfaction with Democracy	**0.259**	***	**-0.05**		**-0.02**		**0.095**		**0.019**		**0.076**	
	0.068		0.058		0.041		0.06		0.056		0.058	
Education	**0.178**	**	**0.072**		**-0.04**		**0.103**		**0.042**		**-0.04**	
	0.065		0.068		0.048		0.073		0.064		0.067	
Manual Worker	**-0.02**		**-0.06**		**-0.003**		**-0.04**		**0.101**		**0.034**	
	0.172		0.146		0.113		0.155		0.138		0.147	
Professional	**-0.08**		**0.105**		**-0.11**		**-0.08**		**0.027**		**-0.12**	
	0.119		0.12		0.088		0.132		0.125		0.12	
cut1												
_cons	-0.53	*	-0.75	**	-1.08	***	0.359		0.022		-0.9	***
	0.262		0.286		0.203		0.284		0.251		0.269	
cut2												
_cons	0.145		-0.05		-0.35		1.08	***	0.584	*	-0.3	
	0.262		0.285		0.202		0.286		0.251		0.268	
chi2	87.2	***	109	***	163	***	101	***	63.4	***	107	***
Log Likelihood	-603		-604		-1114		-588		-676		-574	
Pseudo R square	0.07		0.08		0.07		0.08		0.04		0.09	
Number of Obs.	779		811		1508		613		681		628	

Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients and displays standard errors under the coefficients
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 3.6 Ordered Probit Model of Turkish Public Support for the EU: the Role of Pride in Nationality

	2002		2003		2004		2005	
Prospective Sociotropic	**0.035**		**0.248**	***	**0.247**	***	**0.339**	***
	0.072		0.072		0.068		0.087	
Prospective Egocentric	**0.054**		**0.179**	*	**0.095**		**0.038**	
	0.076		0.079		0.077		0.093	
Trust Government	**0.362**	***	**-0.09**		**0.246**		**0.44**	***
	0.099		0.107		0.128		0.12	
Loss of Cultural Identity	**-0.6**	***	**-0.76**	***	**-0.98**	***	**0.22**	
	0.096		0.096		0.116		0.137	
Proud of Nationality	**0.032**		**-0.1**		**-0.22**	*	**-0.06**	
	0.062		0.076		0.108		0.1	
Education	**0.219**	**	**0.076**		**0.022**		**0.053**	
	0.067		0.069		0.068		0.071	
Manual	**-0.05**		**-0.07**		**-0.16**		**0.169**	
	0.173		0.144		0.165		0.164	
Professional	**-0.05**		**0.076**		**-0.33**	**	**-0.08**	
	0.121		0.12		0.124		0.143	
cut1								
_cons	-0.59		-0.98	**	-1.91	***	-0.1	
	0.323		0.363		0.487		0.463	
cut2								
_cons	0.087		-0.27		-1.05	*	0.594	
	0.322		0.362		0.484		0.463	
chi2	69.1		112		132		82.6	
Log Likelihood	-591		-604		-574		-486	
Pseudo R square	0.055		0.085		0.103		0.078	
Number of Obs.	747		817		733		559	

Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients and displays standard errors under the coefficients.
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.

Table 3.7 Change in Predicted Probabilities

Table 3.3a & 3.3b	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012
Prospective Sociotropic	0.02		0.17	*	0.16	*	0.26	*	0.10		0.05		0.07		0.14	*	0.03		-0.10		-0.10
Prospective Egocentric	0.03		0.12	*	0.08	*	0.03		0.18	*	0.04		0.03		0.01		-0.01		0.14	*	0.22
Trust Government	0.12	*	-0.04		0.04		0.18	*	0.17	*	0.14	*	0.13	*	0.08	*	0.18	*	0.18	*	0.05
Loss of Cultural Identity	-0.24	*	-0.28	*	-0.25	*	0.08		-0.29	*	-0.33	*	-0.32	*	-0.29	*	-0.33	*	-0.22	*	-0.20
Education	0.12	*	0.05		-0.03		0.04		0.07		-0.05		0.05		0.02		-0.04		0.02		-0.16
Manual Worker	-0.02		-0.02		0.01		0.06		-0.02		0.13	*	-0.04		0.02		0.01		-0.06		-0.13
Professional	-0.04		0.04		-0.04		-0.03		-0.04		-0.01		0.00		-0.01		-0.01		-0.05		-0.04
Table 3.4a & 3.4b	**2002**		**2003**		**2004**		**2005**		**2006**		**2007**		**2008**		**2009**		**2010**		**2011**		**2012**
Economic Prosperity	0.09	*	0.36	*	0.23	*	0.24	*	0.21	*	0.28	*	0.29	*	0.31	*	0.30	*	0.17	*	0.29
Free movement	0.15	*	0.21	*	0.09	*	0.13	*	0.25	*	0.13	*	0.19	*	0.06	*	0.18		0.11	*	0.09
Democracy	0.28	*	n/a		0.14	*	0.18	*	0.21	*	0.15	*	0.19	*	0.18	*	0.14	*	0.06		0.06
Table 3.5	**2002**		**2003**		**2004**		**2005**		**2006**		**2007**		**2008**		**2009**		**2010**		**2011**		**2012**
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.23	*	-0.05		-0.02		n/a		0.11		n/a		n/a		0.02		0.09		n/a		n/a
Table 3.6	**2002**		**2003**		**2004**		**2005**		**2006**		**2007**		**2008**		**2009**		**2010**		**2011**		**2012**
Proud of Nationality	0.04		-0.08		-0.19	*	-0.06		n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a		n/a

Note: Cell reports change in the predicted probability of a hypothetical respondent saying "EU membership is a good thing" as the variable of interest is moved from its minimum to maximum value while all other variables are set to its mean. * $p < 0.05$

Table 3.8 Multi-level Mixed Effects Ordinal Logistic Regression

Individual Level Variables	Odds Ratio	
Prospective Sociotropic	**1.166**	***
	0.037	
Prospective Egocentric	**1.172**	***
	0.039	
Trust Government	**1.593**	***
	0.069	
Loss of Cultural Identity	**0.327**	***
	0.015	
Education	**1.017**	
	0.028	
Manual Worker	**0.996**	
	0.062	
Professional	**0.940**	
	0.049	
Country Level Variables		
GDPgrowthrate	**0.992**	*
	0.004	
/cut1	-0.561	***
	0.108	
/cut2	0.421	***
	0.107	
year		
var(_cons)	0.673	
	0.067	
Wald chi2	904.04	
Log Likelihood	-9544	
Number of Obs.	10399	

Note: Cell reports odd ratios for multi level mixed effects ordered logistic regression and displays standard errors under the odd ratios. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Analyses performed using STATA 13.1 meglm commands

CHAPTER 4 –
Party Support and Attitudes towards the EU

Many scholars (Anderson 1998; Tverdova, and Anderson 2004; Gabel and Scheve 2007) argue that citizens rely on cues taken from the political parties they support when answering questions about the EU. Based on past research, we expect that supporters of political parties opposed to EU membership are less likely to be in favor of membership. Focusing on Turkey over time is a particularly good place to study this relationship, because Turkish parties have had changing stances towards EU. Hence, we will be asking here: how closely do party supporters follow these changes?

This chapter aims to explore this relationship between political party preferences and attitudes towards the EU. In order to fulfill this objective, I will first refer to studies that looked at Turkish party positions towards the EU. Then, I will introduce the dataset, operationalization of the variables and methods. This will be followed by first analysis of testing the effect of party preference on support for EU membership over time and then analysis of testing the same effect on a pooled data. After presenting the results of tests of the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2, I will interpret these results using the Clarify program.

Changing Turkish Party Attitudes towards the EU

After Turkey was given official candidate status in the Helsinki summit in 1999; Turkey's EU candidacy was no longer a purely foreign policy issue, but became a domestic policy issue as well. This was because candidacy for EU membership requires

countries to make a broad set of policy adjustments and legal as well as institutional changes. The parties' position on the EU developed in the context of their own political positions inside and outside of government. Table 4.1 shows electoral results of the period analyzed for the most important of these parties

In recent years, scholars (Celep 2011; Gulmez 2013; Jolly and Oktay 2011) have studied Turkish party positions towards the EU. They have given different accounts of how much the parties have actually differed in their stances. For instance, Jolly and Oktay (2011), looking at the 2007 election, focus on five parties (AKP, CHP, MHP, Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP), Youth Party (Genc Parti, GP) with particular emphasis on three of the major parties that won seats. The authors conclude that while some parties have a Eurosceptic tone in their party manifestos, all the parties show commitment to full membership. In other words, while parties may criticize EU, none of them are against Turkey's EU membership. Thus, the authors conclude that they do not belong to the hard Eurosceptic category. In contrast, Yilmaz (2011) assesses parties in terms of their degree of Euroscepticism between 1987 and 2007, and finds much more variation both across parties, and within single parties over time. According to Yilmaz's study (2011, 13), AKP is considered as a pro-European party. Therefore, it is not included in his table of hard/soft Eurosceptics parties. However, the Virtue Party (FP), where AKP party's core members came from, is evaluated as belonging to the Eurosceptic-hard category in 1999. MHP, a party with a Turkish nationalist ideology, was in the Eurosceptic-soft category in 1999 when it was in the coalition, but then it is classified in the Eurosceptic-hard category in 2007 when it became a opposition party. Avci agrees with this observation, and (2011, 444) argues that between the years 2002-

2010, MHP adopted very critical stance: "the MHP has primarily relied on sovereignty-based Euroscepticism but it has never rejected the European project fully." According to Yilmaz, CHP, a party with a Kemalist-secularist ideology was a pro-European party before the 2002 elections. Celep(2011) draws attention to the role of CHP in the development of Turkey and EU relations. It is important to note that both Ankara Agreement and accession to the Customs Union were realized when CHP was in the coalition government. However, after 2002, Yilmaz classifies CHP as Eurosceptic-soft. Celep (2011) argues that the CHP's scepticism towards EU membership is related to CHP's position in opposition and its fight with AKP. The author argues underlines that CHP mainly criticized the way the AKP government was handling the membership process rather than the membership itself

Furthermore, when Turkey became a candidate; it had to carry out political reforms in order to meet the EU's accession criteria so that accession negotiations could begin. The reform processes involved improvement of minority rights such as legalization of the public use of Kurdish and other minority languages. Yilmaz (2011) examines the attitudes of different party supporters on this issue. He states that party supporters of Nationalist Action Party (MHP) representing far-right, Turkish ethno-nationalist constituents are skeptical of the EU. Unsurprisingly, party supporters of the Party for a Democratic Society (DTP), a Kurdish nationalist party, the successor party to the People's Democracy Party (HADEP), and the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), have unconditional support for the EU. In general, the Turkish public perceives the reforms to increase Kurdish rights as attempts to undermine the unitary character of the Turkish state (Muftuler Bac 2005). Hence, scholars (Carkoglu, and Kentmen 2011;

Yilmaz 2011) argue that discussion of the issues of reform process in the public agenda stimulate national sentiments which in turn cause decline in support levels.

In my analysis, I will focus on the three major parties: AKP, the governing party since 2002 up until now, CHP, the main opposition party and MHP, the other opposition party.[3] I selected these parties based on their vote and seat shares (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Results of Turkish Parliamentary Elections for the years 2002, 2007 and 2011

	2002		2007		2011	
	Votes %	**# of Seats**	**Votes %**	**# of Seats**	**Votes %**	**# of Seats**
AKP	34.28	363	46.58	341	49.95	327
CHP	19.39	178	20.88	112	25.94	135
MHP	8.36	0	14.27	71	12.98	53
Independents	1	9	5.24	26	6.57	35

Source: High Election Council (Yuksek Secim Kurulu, YSK)

I also want to provide information about the demographics of these parties based on the three variables; education, gender and age from the study.

[3] Voting intention question in CCEB 2003 survey did not include MHP option in the list of party names.

Table 4.2 Demographics of Party Constituents in the Study

	AKP %	CHP %	MHP %
Education			
Left school at age 15 or younger	67	47	47
Left school at ages 16 to 19	22	31	35
Stayed in school until age 20 or older OR still studying and age 20 or older	11	21	18
Gender			
Female	51	50	28
Male	49	50	72
Age			
18-24	20	23	27
25-34	29	20	28
35-44	21	20	22
45-54	15	17	13
55-64	9	13	6
65 years	7	8	3

Source : (CCEB 2002 and CCEB 2003, Transatlantic Trends surveys, 2003-2013)

Before the analysis section, I want to restate my hypotheses regarding party preference, Hypotheses 8, 9, and 10. Because some of the parties changed their own attitudes towards the EU during this decade, and because some of them moved from inside to outside government, these hypotheses which predict a stable effect of party support potentially come into conflict with Hypothesis 6, which posits that government support is a proxy for EU support. Drawing on the studies about Turkish party positions on EU membership, I expect to see that party constituents will change their stances as their parties change their stances. In that regard, I hypothesize that AKP voters will be more likely to support EU membership after their party came to power. CHP voters will

be less likely to support EU membership after AKP came to power and their party is in opposition. I also expect that MHP voters will be less likely to support EU membership after AKP came to power and their party is in opposition.

Introducing the Data

In this chapter, I use both Transatlantic Trends Surveys[4] and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer Surveys (CCEB) to study changing Turkish attitudes towards the EU for the time period 2002-2013, this time taking into account party preferences among respondents.[5] I will be utilizing two CCEB surveys that I used in Chapter 3[6]. Transatlantic Trends Surveys are a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo. These surveys are conducted in the USA and 13 European countries to understand public opinion about foreign policy issues and trans-Atlantic issues such as Turkey's EU membership. The surveys have been conducted

[4] Transatlantic Trend Surveys- 2003 (ICPSR 3972), 2004 (ICPSR 4243), 2005 (ICPSR 4605), 2006 (ICPSR 20302), 2007 (ICPSR 28187), 2008 (ICSPR 26501), 2009 (ICPSR 28462), 2010 (ICPSR 33021), 2011 (ICPSR 34422), 2013 (ICPSR 34973).

[5] The European Social Survey (ESS) asks respondents if there is a political party they feel closer to than all other parties. While ESS has been conducted every two years since 2002, Turkey was included only in Round 2(2004) and Round4 (2008). Moreover the ESS had few questions about the EU that I could utilize as a dependent variable; the two questions that were asked did not really tap into evaluation of EU membership. One of the questions asked respondents to tell if they think European unification should go further or has already gone too far. The other one asked if the respondent trusts in European parliament or not. Hence, I continued to look for other surveys until I found vote intention question in Transatlantic Trends Surveys.

[6] CCEB 2002.2, September-October 2002; CCEB 2003.4, October-November 2003

annually since 2003; Turkey has been included since 2004. Due to some problems with the data provided by the survey, I had to exclude year 2012 from the analysis[7]. Nevertheless, these sources still provide me with the chance to analyze the partisan dynamics of EU support in Turkey over more than a decade.

In Chapter 3, I investigated the role of domestic cues, including government support, and satisfaction with democracy in the formation of attitudes towards EU. However, I was not able to look at the link between voting intentions and EU support since the question was discontinued in EB surveys. One main advantage of using Transatlantic Trends Surveys is that the voting intention question is asked every year whereas in EB surveys, the question about respondent's voting intention for the next national elections was asked only in 2002 and 2003. However, I am employing both sets of surveys because Turkey was not included in the Transatlantic Trends Surveys until 2004; using both sets of surveys thus provides the longest available view of partisan effects in shaping Turkish attitudes towards the EU. Using the Transatlantic Trends Surveys thus makes it possible to go beyond the analysis in Chapter 3 by adding a specifically partisan dimension. In addition, looking at this second data source makes it possible to re-test some of the hypotheses reviewed in Chapter 3, to see if the new data confirm the previous chapter's findings. Unfortunately, the questions in the two surveys only partially overlap, meaning that such a re-test can be done only for the hypotheses about the effect of educational attainment and belonging to a certain occupational group.

The 2012 survey did not ask the question that is my dependent variable, whether Turkey's EU membership would be a good thing, neither good nor bad, or a bad thing.

Therefore, I can not fully replicate the analysis of Chapter 3. Another drawback of using Transatlantic Trends Surveys is that although there are many questions asked specifically on the topic of Turkey's EU membership, such as opinion about the benefits of EU membership for Turkey's economy or opinion about likelihood of Turkey's membership, they are not regularly asked. Therefore, I was not able to include them in the analysis.

Changing Turkish Attitudes towards the EU

Figure 4.1 shows how the Turkish public evaluated EU membership between the years 2002-2013. Note that the data points for the year 2002 and the year 2003 belong to the EB series whereas the years afterwards belong to Transatlantic Trends Survey. It is important to note that the data confirms the same decline that the EB data shows in the previous chapter (Figure 3.1). Transatlantic Trends data gives the same story as EB data about changing Turkish attitudes towards the EU. In 2002, 67 percent of the respondents expressed a positive view of EU membership. In 2004, Euro-enthusiasm reached its peak when 73 percent of the Turkish public said EU membership is a good thing. Then, we observe a drastic decline in support for the EU after the start of accession negotiations in 2005. Since then, the graph shows some ups and downs in the level of support while Turkey and EU relations were also having their own ups and downs. After 2005, the highest level of support is 54 percent while the lowest level of support is 38 percent. In 2013, only 44 percent of the public said that EU membership is a good thing. The graph looks slightly different than the graph provided in the previous chapter. However, it is also important to note that we lost one data point for year 2012 and there is one additional year, 2013.

Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the EU would be…?



Figure 4.1 Public Support for the EU, 2002-2013
Source : (CCEB 2002 and CCEB 2003, Transatlantic Trends Surveys, 2003-2013)

% of Different Party Constituents Saying EU is a Good Thing



Figure 4.2 Level of Public Support for the EU, by Political Party 2002-2013[8]
Source: (CCEB 2002and CCEB 2003, Transatlantic Trends Surveys, 2003-2013)

[8] Vote intention question in the CCEB 2003 survey does not include MHP in the list of the parties.

Figure 4.2 depicts the changing attitudes towards EU over time for the three party constituents. The graph shows that CHP voters started out very positive declined to the lowest level in 2008, and then became slightly more positive. The highest support among the CHP voters was observed in 2002 with a value of 87 percent. AKP voters were not that enthusiastic in the beginning; however this changed quickly and they become pro-Europeans in the following years. In 2002, 63 percent of AKP voters said EU membership was a good thing while in the following years, 74 percent of AKP voters said EU membership was a good thing. MHP voters were always the least supportive, but this also showed change. MHP voters were not as enthusiastic as other parties' constituents about the pursuit of EU membership. In 2013, 54 percent of AKP supporters, 36 percent of CHP supporters and 35 percent of MHP supporters state that EU is a good thing.

Yilmaz (2006) draws attention to the attitudinal change between AKP voters and CHP voters. In his data, CHP voters become Euro-sceptic while AKP voters become Euro-enthusiastic. Figure 4.2 suggests a similar pattern between AKP voters and CHP voters, especially at the beginning. In a later study Gulmez (2013) refers to the attitudinal shift in AKP and CHP at the party level from euro-supportiveness to euroscepticism. The graph depicts the decline in support for all party constituents. However, this is least observed among AKP voters.

Model and Variables

The dependent variable is the same survey question that I used in Chapter 3. The question is as follows "Generally speaking, do you think your country's membership of the EU would be a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?" I will run ordered

probit regression. As mentioned before, interpretation of coefficients for independent variables in an ordered probit model is not straightforward. Therefore, I will employ Clarify software to calculate first differences to offer more meaningful interpretation of the results.

The independent variables are vote choice, education, age, gender and occupation. Based on the question about voter intention for the next national elections, I constructed three dummy variables for three parties: AKP, CHP and MHP. As I mentioned before, these parties are selected to study due to their vote share in the elections for the last decade. The base group includes the respondents who said they were going to vote for other parties or respondents who said don't know/won't vote.

Results

Testing the Effect of Party Support Over Time

Table 4.3 shows the results for ordered probit analysis of attitudes towards the EU for the period 2002-2013. In 2002, the dummy variable for AKP voter is statistically significant and the coefficient has a negative sign. In other words, if the respondent is AKP voter, she/he is less likely to say EU membership is a good thing. In 2003, this variable is again statistically significant but the sign of the coefficient is positive. In that case, if the respondent is AKP voter, she/he is more likely to support EU member. We witness the change in attitudes among AKP voters from Eurosceptic stance to Pro-European stance over a short period of time. Since then, most of the years (2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2011 and 2013), the variable is statistically significant and the coefficient has

positive sign suggesting that AKP voters continued to have pro-European stance over the years.

In 2002, the dummy variable for CHP voter is statistically significant and has positive sign. In other words, if the respondent is a CHP voter, she/he is more likely to support EU membership. In the following years, the variable is no longer significant while the sign of the coefficient is sometimes negative.

The dummy variable for MHP is statistically significant only for years 2004 and 2007 and it has negative sign. The respondents who express their support for MHP when asked about their vote intentions for next national elections is less likely to say EU is a good thing . Though insignificant, the coefficient for MHP variable has negative sign most of the time.

In order to interpret the size of these effects, we can use predicted probabilities to simulate the effects. Table 4.4 shows the change in predicted probability of a respondent saying the EU is a good thing when the specific party variable is changed from 0 to 1 while the other party variables are set to 0, party of interest is set to 1 and all control variables are set to their mean values. If the respondent says that he/she will vote for AKP for the next elections, the effect on the probability of saying EU membership is a good thing is negative 0.09 percent in 2002 while the effect is positive 0.06 in 2003. In 2007, the effect is positive 0.15. We observe the greatest impact of this variable in 2013 with a value of positive 0.19.

Simulation results for year 2002 indicate that CHP variable has a substantive effect with a value of 0.16 on the probability of respondent saying EU is a good thing.

When the respondent expresses his/her intention to vote for MHP for the next elections, the effect on the probability of saying EU membership is a good thing is negative 0.28 percent in 2004. In 2007, the magnitude of the effect is less than 2004 but still a high value. It is negative 0.19.

The results partially support the hypotheses. For some years, our findings are in line with our expectations. While evaluating the results, I would like to put emphasis on the question of which party was in the government and which party was in the opposition at the time of survey. The 2002 survey was conducted from September through October 2002 while the 2002 General elections took place in November. When the 2002 survey was conducted, there was a coalition government between Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP) and Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) and MHP. In 1999 elections, CHP failed to pass the 10 percent threshold and was not represented in the parliament. In terms of political position and ideology, DSP and CHP share the same values. DSP was founded by Bulent Ecevit, former leader of CHP party. Both of the parties situate themselves in the centre left and identify Kemalism and social democracy as their ideology.ANAP situates itself centre right and identifies economic liberalism, social conservatism and nationalism as its ideology. AKP was founded in 2001 and came to power with 2002 elections.

As expected, AKP voters are less likely to support EU membership before AKP comes to power. However, we witness that once AKP is in power, there is an attitudinal

change among AKP constituents in terms of their views about EU. Over time the effect continues to be positive. In 2007, the survey was conducted in June and elections took place in July 2007. The effect of the AKP variable on attitudes was substantially high in this year. The effect of the MHP variable was also high compared to other years. It is possible that MHP became more critical of the EU project to attract votes from its base, which is already sceptic of the EU compared to other party constituents during the campaign period. "EU support is not typical of the MHP's constituency, since the MHP voter is considered to be rather Eurosceptic" (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu, 2007 cited in Avci 2011)

In 2010, we see again that party support is a good predictor of attitudes towards EU among AKP voters. This is the year when the Turkish constitutional referendum took place. The support level was highest in 2013. It is interesting to note that survey took place during the time of Gezi protests. In that time period, EU parliament had passed a resolution that criticizes the government's actions during the Gezi Park event and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, former prime minister had declared that his government does not recognize the resolution. In this case, we see that party constituents failed to adopt the position of their party quickly. It is possible to speculate that they might need more time to acquire the information from their environment and use this new information to form their opinion.

When we look at CHP voters, we see that they were highly supportive of the EU project in 2002 before the elections. However, once AKP came to power and CHP became the main opposition party, we do not see the continuation of this effect but we do not see significant negative effect. Gulmez (2013) states that when CHP took its place in

the parliament as the main opposition party, it became highly critical of EU's conditionality. Celep (2011) argues that CHP's skepticism towards EU was not expected as CHP was historically committed to the development of EU relations. Furthermore, the author explains that this was not an ideological change but it was due to CHP's position in opposition and its fight with AKP electorally and politically. Based on the hypothesis about CHP, we normally would expect that following party cues, CHP voters would adopt a highly critical stance. But, we do not see this completely. Indeed, this seems to support the observation by Yilmaz (2011: 20) that "Euroscepticism is relatively new to CHP constituency and has not yet become a firm and fixed characteristic of this group". It is also possible to argue that if CHP's skepticism was not towards the very essence of EU membership as mentioned by Celep (2011), then we would not also see critical views of EU membership among CHP voters.

Re-testing the Impact of Economic Variables Over Time

As mentioned above, the Transatlantic Trends Surveys allow us to re-test some of the findings from Chapter 3 about other factors that influence EU support in Turkey. However, this re-testing is necessarily limited to a small number of variables that are regularly used in both surveys for the period 2004-2013. In terms of educational attainment effect, the education variable is statistically significant and the coefficient has positive sign in 2002.[9] In other words, the higher the level of education the respondent has, the more likely he/she is to support EU membership. This is in line with Gabel's hypothesis regarding human capital. However, we do not observe any significant relation between level of education and attitudes towards EU in the following years. When we

[9] The data for year 2002 is from CCEB survey

look at the effect of occupational group variables on attitudes towards EU, we observe that the professional variable is never significant while the manual worker variable is statistically significant only in 2010 and 2011. The sign of the coefficient is negative. In other words, if the respondent is manual worker, she/he is less likely to support EU membership. Similar to the findings from Chapter 3, occupational group variables do not seem to be a consistently good predictor of attitudes towards the EU. To the extent that there is a relationship, the negative attitudes of manual workers are contrary to the predictions of hypothesis 4.

Testing the Party Effect and Re-testing the Impact of Economic Variables by Using Pooled Data

As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, I will now look at the effect of the variables on the dependent variable by repeating the analysis using pooled data. Using pooled data contributes to the increased statistical power and will provide further assessment of the variables. Table 4.5 provides the results of our analysis with pooled data. According to the results, AKP variable is statistically significant and has a positive sign. If the respondent is an AKP voter, he/she is more likely to express support for the EU membership. CHP variable is also statistically significant and has a positive sign. In that case, CHP voters are also more likely to support the EU membership. By looking at the change in predicted probabilities table 4.6, we can compare the size of the impact between CHP and AKP voters. The effect of AKP voter on the likelihood of saying EU membership is a good thing is positive 0.10 percent while the effect of CHP voter on the likelihood of saying EU membership is a good thing is 0.05 percent. If the respondent is

MHP voter, she/he is less likely to support EU membership. Simulations results the reveal that the impact of MHP variable on the dependent variable is negative 0.08.

Furthermore, the re-testing of the economic variables show that occupational group variables do not play any role in the formation of opinion while the education variable is positive and statistically significant. Table 4.6 shows the impact of the change on the dependent variable when there is a change in the education variable from its minimum to its maximum value for each of the constituent group. I found only significant impact on AKP voter. It is a small effect with a value of positive 0.03. In other words, increasing the education level for MHP and CHP did not matter for support level.

Summary

One of the main findings of this chapter is that party voters most of the time mimic the party stances of their parties when it comes to opinion about EU. Scholars who study political party positions had found that CHP had switched its position from a pro-European party to a Eurosceptic party. When MHP was in coalition between the years 1999 and 2002, party's stance towards EU was classified as soft Eurosceptic by Yilmaz (2011). However, after it left coalition, it adopted more sceptic position towards EU. After 2002 elections, AKP party came to with a pro-European agenda. Building on the study of Zaller (1992) that argues public opinion is cued by political elites, Gabel and Scheve (2007) identify a causal effect of elite opinion on individual opinion formation. Basically, the authors argue that if there is an elite consensus in the member countries of the European Union, mass public opinion is also favorable. Accordingly, decreasing consensus or increasing polarization implies less favorable elite messages about Europe. In that respect, the authors conclude that negative elite messages about European

integration do indeed decrease public support for Europe. The Turkish case seems to be in line with Gabel and Scheve's argument that when there was consensus among the political parties, the support for the EU integration was high, but that this weakened as elite opinion became more divided. Turkish public opinion is like EU opinion, in that public opinion is sensitive to elite consensus/division. The chapter drew attention to the importance of party cues in explaining EU support among the respondents.

Table 4.3a Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: Party Preferences, 2002-2006

	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006	
AKP	**-0.266**	*	**0.188**	*	**-0.083**		**0.369**	***	**0.207**	*
	0.12		0.10		0.11		0.10		0.09	
CHP	**0.565**	**	**0.123**		**-0.148**		**0.222**		**0.154**	
	0.18		0.15		0.17		0.15		0.16	
MHP	**-0.362**				**-0.756**	**	**-0.268**		**-0.125**	
	0.19				0.25		0.17		0.18	
Education	**0.213**	**	**0.081**		**-0.029**		**0.081**		**-0.012**	
	0.07		0.07		0.07		0.06		0.07	
Professional	**-0.096**		**0.150**		**-0.002**		**0.049**		**-0.159**	
	0.12		0.12		0.16		0.12		0.17	
Manual Worker	**0.035**		**-0.011**		**-0.046**		**0.045**		**0.15**	
	0.17		0.14		0.17		0.14		0.13	
cut1										
_cons	**-0.885**	***	**-1.03**	***	**-1.67**	***	**-0.87**	***	**-0.992**	***
	0.21		0.21		0.23		0.18		0.19	
cut2										
_cons	**-0.253**		**-0.412**	*	**-1.08**	***	**-0.291**		**-0.444**	*
	0.20		0.20		0.22		0.18		0.19	
chi2	38.4	*	10.3		11.8		29.8	*	24.1	*
Log Likelihood	-575.22		-653.442		-554.939		-765.238		-819.995	
Pseudo R square	0.03		0.01		0.01		0.02		0.01	
Number of obs.	751		828		806		873		859	

Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients with standard errors under the coefficients.
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
Transatlantic Trend surveys (2004-2013), CCEB surveys (2002 &2003)

Table 4.3b Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: Party Preferences, 2007-2013 (continued)

	2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2013	
AKP	**0.378**	***	**0.169**		**0.14**		**0.335**	***	**0.193**	*	**0.47**	***
	0.09		0.09		0.10		0.10		0.09		0.10	
CHP	**0.153**		**-0.237**		**-0.035**		**0.069**		**0.134**		**0.181**	
	0.18		0.15		0.12		0.11		0.11		0.13	
MHP	**-0.527**	***	**0.046**		**-0.157**		**-0.15**		**-0.255**		**-0.019**	
	0.17		0.16		0.15		0.18		0.17		0.16	
Education	**-0.003**		**-0.13**		**0.064**		**0.029**		**-0.027**		**-0.031**	
	0.07		0.07		0.07		0.07		0.05		0.07	
Professional	**0.094**		**-0.141**		**-0.246**		**-0.047**		**-0.139**		**0.273**	
	0.14		0.14		0.15		0.16		0.13		0.14	
Manual Worker	**0.002**		**-0.011**		**-0.205**		**-0.277**	*	**-0.282**	*	**0.129**	
	0.12		0.13		0.11		0.13		0.12		0.11	
cut1												
_cons	**-0.465**	*	**-0.824**	***	**-0.646**	***	**-0.462**	***	**-0.588**	***	**-0.216**	
	0.20		0.19		0.20		0.20		0.17		0.19	
cut2												
_cons	**0.034**		**-0.277**		**-0.028**		**0.146**		**-0.134**		**0.132**	
	0.20		0.19		0.20		0.19		0.17		0.19	
chi2	46.8		20	*	10.8		23.7	*	18.4	**	41.4	***
Log Likelihood	-812.547		-863.597		-837.549		-855.636		-921.619		-762.014	
Pseudo R squ	0.03		0.01		0.01		0.01		0.01		0.03	
Number of obs.	805		829		830		810		924		793	

Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients with standard errors under the coefficients.
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
Transatlantic Trend surveys (2004-2013), CCEB surveys (2002 &2003)

Table 4.4 Change in Predicted Probabilities

	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008	2009	2010		2011		2013	
AKP	-0.10	*	0.06	*	-0.03		0.13	*	0.08	*	0.149	*	0.07	0.06	0.13	*	0.08	*	0.19	*
CHP	0.15	*	0.04		-0.05		0.07		0.06		0.06		-0.09	-0.01	0.03		0.05		0.07	
MHP	-0.13				-0.27	*	-0.11		-0.05		-0.19	*	0.02	-0.06	-0.05		-0.10		-0.01	

Note: Cell reports change in the predicted probability of a hypothetical respondent saying "EU membership is a good thing" when the specific party variable is changed from 0 to 1 while the other party variables are set to 0, specific party is set to 1 and all control variables are set to their mean values.
* $p < 0.05$

Table 4.5 Ordered Probit Model of Public Support for the EU: Party Preferences

AKP	0.254	***
	0.03	
CHP	0.122	***
	0.042	
MHP	-0.213	***
	0.053	
Education	0.039	**
	0.02	
Professional	-0.058	
	0.042	
Manual	-0.047	
	0.04	
Year	-0.078	
	0.004	
cut1		
_cons	-157	***
	8.63	
cut2		
_cons	-157	***
	8.63	
chi2	462.61	
Log Likelihood	-7944.7	
Pseudo R squ	0.03	
Number of obs.	8280	

Note: Cell reports ordered probit coefficients with robust standard errors under the coefficients.
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
Transatlantic Trends surveys (2004-2013), CCEB surveys (2002 &2003)

Table 4.6 Change in Predicted Probabilities

	2002-2013	
AKP	0.10	*
CHP	0.05	*
MHP	-0.08	*
Education_AKP	0.03	*
Education_CHP	0.03	
Education_MHP	0.03	

Note: Cell reports change in the predicted probability of a hypothetical respondent saying "EU membership is a good thing" when the specific variable is changed from its minimum to maximum value while the other party variables are set to 0, specific party is set to 1 and all control variables are set to their mean values. * $p < 0.05$

CHAPTER 5 –
Conclusion

The study of public attitudes towards the EU first conceptualized as support for integration and later as Euroscepticism, has been the focus of academic research for a long time. While many factors are involved in determining public opinion, the existing theoretical framework for understanding attitudes toward the EU has emphasized the role of economic considerations (Eichenberg, and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998), domestic political considerations (Anderson 1998), and identity (Hooghe, and Marks 2004; McLaren 2002). In this research, I have studied the evolution of public opinion in Turkey towards EU over the past decade in order to answer two main questions: (1) Do previously-developed theories of support for EU integration adequately explain the Turkish case? In other words, is Turkey really different from other countries that are candidates to the EU? (2) Can a single model be adequate to explain opinion on an issue whose salience and political meaning have shifted over time? To answer these two questions, I have tested several hypotheses developed out of the main theoretical approaches using longitudinal data. In this concluding chapter, I will briefly refer to the results of the hypothesis testing and summarize the main findings.

Main Findings

Domestic Political Considerations

Hypothesis 6 and 7 dealt with testing the effect of domestic political considerations. The tests in Chapters 3 and 4 showed that they are only partly supported.

The advantage of using two different data series was that I was able to test the effect of government support and system support in Chapter 3 while I looked at the effect of specific party support in Chapter 4. In my study, I found that the attitudes toward the incumbent government and party preference matter most of the time while system support measured as satisfaction with democracy was only significant in year 2001. The results suggests that while citizens use the context of domestic politics to formulate their opinion, the type of the proxies that they choose to depend on varies across cases and across time.

The question then arises: why was system support a good predictor of attitudes towards the EU in 2002 but not in other years? Kalaycioglu (2010) separates the effect of the EU on the democratization of the Turkish political regime into two periods. The first one includes the years 1993-2002, in which reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria were discussed in a multi-partisan environment and were part of national project shared by all political parties. The second period includes the aftermath of 2002 elections, in which constitutional amendments to meet EU criteria were presented as a partisan accomplishment of the AKP. It is possible that collaboration among different parties to realize the reforms led people link their views about functioning of democracy to their views about the EU in 2002.

Looking at the effect of specific party support on the views about EU membership in Chapter 4, we see that the change in attitudes of party constituents reflects the change in their party's stance towards the EU, as hypotheses 7, 8, and 9 predict. In brief, AKP voters switched from a Eurosceptic view of EU to a Pro-European view when AKP

became the governing party that was in charge of relations with EU. On the other hand, CHP supporters closely mirrored the position of their party. When the CHP had a pro-European stance in 2002, CHP constituents also tended to be positive when asked about EU membership. In later years, when the CHP adopted Eurosceptic rhetoric, we observe that party support variable for CHP voters is no longer a good predictor in explaining their attitudes towards EU. After 2002, the sign of the coefficient is sometimes negative but never significant. After MHP left the coalition government, it adopted more skeptical stance. Hence, attitudes of MHP voters reflected their party's position in the following years.

Economic Considerations

Because the EU's roots go back to the EEC, with its goal of promoting affluence and economic efficiency, scholars (Eichenberg, and Dalton 1993; Gabel, and Whitten 1997) have investigated the effect of economic conditions on the evaluations of EU membership and have found that economic evaluations do play an important role in determining public opinion on EU. I also examined whether Turks incorporate their expectations regarding national economy and personal financial situation when answering questions about the EU. Hypotheses 1 and 2 dealt with economic evaluations. As expected, I found that Turks associate their economic evaluations to their views on EU membership. Focusing on a time span of 10 years enabled me to observe the dynamics of this relation. It is important to note that the effect of economic evaluations changed its character over time. At first, the relationship between sociotropic economic evaluations and EU support was positive. In recent years, it became negative. This raises the question of why we see a change in the direction of the effect of economic

evaluations. The most likely explanation seems to be that this change coincides with the change in the relative economic conditions for Turkey and the EU. In the aftermath of the global economic crisis, Turkey's economic performance was much better than many countries in the Eurozone countries. As a result, the number of Turkish respondents who associate the EU with economic prosperity also declined over time.

A third set of hypotheses was about the effect of education and occupational skills. Based on the idea that human capital determines a person's adaptability to the changes introduced by the liberalization of labor market, Gabel (1998) hypothesized that lower skilled workers are likely to have more negative evaluations of European integration. In reaction, Brinegar and Jolly (2005) underlined that to understand how skills might matter, we need to look at national factor endowments and varieties of capitalism. Turkey is a labor abundant country compared to Western European countries. Accordingly, in Chapter 3, I hypothesized that low skilled workers would be more likely to support EU membership due to the opportunities that arise from free movement. In my analysis, I found that the manual worker variable was significant only in two years. In 2007, the finding for manual worker was in line with Brinegar and Jolly's expectation that manual workers will be more likely to support EU membership; in contrast, in 2012, the finding for manual worker was in line with Gabel's hypothesis that manual workers will be less likely to support EU membership. In other words, the results were indecisive, with the bigger message seeming to be that this factor is not consistently relevant for determining attitudes in this area.

That raises the question of why occupational variables were not a good predictor. These findings and my findings on professional status and education (not consistent predictors) seem more in line with Ehin (2001), and Elgun and Tillman (2007). Perhaps, as Elgun and Tillman state, a revision of the utilitarian theory human capital hypothesis is necessary. Elgun and Tillman (2007, 397) point out that the findings for two samples (2004 accession states and post 2004 candidate countries) differed as citizens in the second group of countries do not link their occupational status or educational attainment to their attitudes. The authors explain that the impact of human capital is contingent on exposure to the distributive consequences of European integration. In the Turkish case, it is possible to argue that the credibility of Turkey's membership was far from clear. This might explain why individuals do not incorporate their occupation status when forming their opinion: in other words, they fail to see it as something that is likely to have direct personal consequences for their livelihood. Another explanation might be that manual workers have no intention of moving to seek work. Further research might look if manual workers' answers would change if they are presented in a survey with a framing that EU membership is in close future or if they are asked whether they intend to benefit from freedom of movement in the future.

In terms of educational attainment, only in 2000 do the findings support the hypothesis that people with a higher level of education are more likely support membership. Later time periods never again show a significant positive relationship. Moreover, in 2012, the relationship is significant but it is not in the theoretically expected direction. At this point, when the level of education increases, people become less likely to associate EU as a good thing. This also shows that the Turkish case does not fit to the

expectations regarding the effect of education when we focus on changes in attitudes over time. Only in pooled data, we find support for the positive effect of education when looking at specific party effect. However, the effect was very small.

Identity

As Arikan (2012) stresses, since most of the Turkish accession debate revolves around national identity, the Turkish case provides an opportunity to test whether identity has an impact when people are answering questions regarding EU membership. McLaren (2004) draws attention to the role of feelings when explaining opposition to the European integration. She argues that the EU can be seen as a threat to the long established national identities by the citizens. When studying the effect of fear of loss of national identity due to integration, McLaren finds that while large proportions of EU citizens do indeed fear that the EU is threatening their national identity and culture, this effect is not all that substantial. She underlines that other factors play an equal or greater role in explaining individual-level opposition to the EU.

In contrast, in the Turkish case, I found that associating the EU with loss of cultural identity on support for the EU had a consistent and substantial effect. The people who identified the EU with loss of cultural identity were less likely to say EU membership is a good thing. This effect endured across the entire decade (2002-2012), with the effect seeming to stay the same as time progressed. The only exception was the year 2005, perhaps because this was the year when accession negotiations were opened with Turkey.

The Challenges of Imperfect Data

Though surveys provide us with important information to investigate public opinion, they are far from perfect. Most painfully, we are limited by the questions that were previously and consistently asked when we try to reconstruct the evolution of attitudes on any issue. To study Turkish attitudes towards the EU, I relied on Eurobarometer surveys in Chapter 3. I was able to look at a time span of 10 years between 2002 and 2012. Eurobarometer surveys are commonly used in research analysing support for EU integration. One advantage for scholars is that they can replicate other studies and build on their work. In my case, using Eurobarometer surveys enabled me to compare my findings to other studies that focused on different cases. Many of the questions are asked regularly. Although I did not have a panel data, the fact that the same questions were asked regularly enabled me to look at changes in attitudes over time. Paradoxically, however, this advantage at the same time limited the scope of my investigation, because I needed to work only with questions that were continuously asked.

Despite its importance as a variable, the vote intention question is asked only a few times in EB surveys. Therefore, I was not able include this variable in my model in Chapter 3. Accordingly, I searched for an alternative survey that asks a question about which party the respondent supports. Transatlantic Trends Surveys include a question about vote intention for the next national elections and it is asked every year. Since these surveys have also the same question that I used as a dependent variable previously; I decided to use Transatlantic Trends Surveys to further the question on the relation between party cues and attitudes towards EU. Nevertheless, Transatlantic Trends Surveys

did not have the other questions that I utilized previously, so I was unable to precisely replicate my analysis for Chapter 3 using Transatlantic Trend Surveys.

Even given these challenges in finding appropriate data, it was encouraging to see that Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 provided very similar messages about which factors have been shaping Turkish attitudes towards the EU. For instance, occupational status and education were not consistently important in either survey. Similarly, both showed a similar change over time in basic approval of the EU.

In the tradition of studies about attitudes towards the EU, researchers have used case studies of single countries to examine whether a country's specific characteristics have an impact on attitudes towards EU. One distinctive national characteristic that might have been expected to influence attitudes towards the EU was that Turkey's population is predominantly Muslim, something that distinguishes it from other EU countries. The role of "Muslim Identity" of Turks in shaping EU citizens' perceptions of Turkey's membership has been studied by scholars (Carkoglu 2003; Kentmen 2008). It would be interesting to examine whether having a Muslim identity affects Turkish public opinion on EU membership. Here again, however, my study came up against data limits, because the question regarding religiosity has not been asked regularly in either of my surveys. Some of the EB surveys did include a question on "religious practice", but other scholars have shown that this is not a good measure for capturing this concept (cf. Carkoglu 2003, 182). Unfortunately, I was not able to incorporate this variable.

In other words, this dissertation has been an attempt to tease as much as possible out of imperfect data sources. We are lucky that so many surveys in the twenty-first

century have regularly asked Turkish citizens about their attitudes towards the EU. The question of EU membership has been an important one in these years, but the political and economic context of membership has changed. Thus, we are able to learn a great deal about the factors driving opinion formation by looking at trends across these separate surveys. Nevertheless, if I had the opportunity to conduct my ideal survey to study Turkish public opinion, I would include questions about party preference, religiosity and knowledge questions about EU. I would also like to include a better measurement to tap into the effect of national identity on attitudes.

What cannot be remedied at this point is the lack of good surveys prior to 2002. Turkey applied to EU membership in 1959. However, up until 1991, we did not see any attempts to conduct surveys. The initial surveys in the 1990s were important, but they had problems with sampling. According to Carkoglu, (2003) the samples were not representative of all country. It is too late to remedy this problem, but hopefully if scholars make good use of existing data they can make a persuasive case for the continued inclusion of these questions in regular surveys such as Eurobarometer, ESS and Transatlantic Trends.

Conclusions and Implications for Policy and Research

There is no doubting the fact that the debate about EU membership is an important aspect of Turkish politics. Turkey's EU candidacy is no longer treated as a foreign policy issue, but has become a domestic policy issue because the candidacy for EU membership requires a broad set of policy adjustments and legal as well institutional changes. This importance for Turkish politics is likely to continue in the foreseeable

future. Turkey has been a candidate country since 1999, and negotiations are continuing with no end in sight. Before the accession negotiations opened in 2005, Turkish people were highly supportive of the EU project due to the prospect of entering the Union. Turkish support for the EU has declined over time, yet the project is still on the table.

As the results of my analysis shows, party cues matter in determining public opinion on EU. In the case of Turkey, the linkage between political parties and public was an important determinant of attitudes towards EU because when parties change their stances about EU membership, their party constituents also followed them. Turkish case supports the argument of Taggart and Sczerbiak (2004) that the level of Euroscepticism a party adopts depends on whether that party is in the government or not.

It is possible to argue that if there was a coalition government the EU project would be seen as national project rather than a project of only one party where AKP was pursuing its own priorities and vision through the reform processes. Kalaycioglu (2010) points out that many evaluate AKP as a political organization of Islamist movement rather than a party of democracy. For the foreseeable future, a coalition government is not likely. Indeed, Ozbudun (2014, 155) states that "in power since 2002, winner of three consecutive elections with increasing majorities, the AKP qualifies as a predominant party." Because of this, and because the EU is seen as a partner of AKP, opponents of the AKP are likely to question the EU reform process. If support from different constituents is required, then the reforms suggested by the EU should be negotiated by all major parties. Otherwise, the handling of the EU reform process by one party will be seen as partisan and non-transparent. Hence, even if it has a legislative majority, without the

support of other parties for the EU process, the government will lack the necessary public support for the realization of reforms. As mentioned before, Turkish public opinion is like EU opinion, in that public opinion is sensitive to elite consensus/division. Following Gabel and Scheve (2007), I expect that if there is a consensus among Turkish political parties in the future as it was in the case of coalition government of 1999-2002, the support for the EU integration will increase.

While my main approach was to test the theories in the existing literature to understand determinants of Turkish attitudes towards EU, I also emphasized the importance of looking at the context. The change in the direction of the effect of national economic evaluations suggests that in eyes of public, the EU might no longer be seen as responsible for stabilization and economic development. Since, public opinion in Turkey seems to follow party support on this issue, parties' positions are probably also influenced by their perceptions of which issues are popular. In this regard, it seems unlikely that Turkish politicians or Turkish citizens will show much enthusiasm for Europe unless and until EU economic growth becomes positive relative to the Turkish economy. Then, in that case, political elite should put more emphasis on the political aspect of membership that includes democratization efforts. However, political reforms should be discussed and negotiated until there is a consensus reached by different political parties. If there is one party in charge of the negotiation process, that party should consult the opposition so that reform process is not exploited by a party who wants to pursue only its own interests rather than national interests. Only then, support for EU membership can increase and the prospect of EU membership becomes likely.

The loss of cultural identity variable has a consistently strong effect on the attitudes. If people are less likely to support EU membership due to their fear of losing cultural identity, perhaps framing that presents the issue in a positive way such as cultural diversity or cultural richness might lead more positive attitudes.

This research showed that studying attitudes over time provides a more comprehensive and accurate picture of dynamics of public opinion. While research based on a snapshot might help us to understand attitudes towards EU for a specific year, we cannot extrapolate the results to other years. Focusing on attitudes over time pointed out that it is not only the effect of the variables in the model changes but sometimes the direction of the effect of the variables also changes. Hence, this study suggests that while testing the theories of support for EU integration, it is important to look at the background of how relations between a candidate country and the EU evolved, and to take account of changing economic and political situations. In Turkey and elsewhere, we should expect public opinion on this issue to be dynamic, and to be influenced by factors both within and outside of the country.

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APPENDIX –
Survey Questions and Responses

Eurobarometer Surveys

- **Generally speaking, do you think that Turkey's membership to the EU would be…?**
  - A good thing
  - A bad thing
  - Neither good nor bad
  - DK

- **What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to…?**
  The economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY)
  - Better
  - Worse
  - Same
  - DK

- **What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to…?**
  The financial situation of your household
  - Better
  - Worse
  - Same
  - DK

- **I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or not to trust it. The Turkish Government**
  - Tend to trust
  - Tend not to trust
  - DK

- **What does the EU mean to you personally?**

- Peace
- Economic prosperity
- Democracy
- Social Protection
- Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU
- Cultural diversity
- Stronger say in the world
- Euro
- Unemployment
- Bureaucracy
- Waste of money
- Loss of cultural identity
- More crime
- Not enough control at external borders
- Other
- DK

- **On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)**
  - Very satisfied
  - Fairly satisfied
  - Not very satisfied
  - Not at all satisfied
  - DK

- **Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be Turkish?**
  - Very proud
  - Fairly proud
  - Not very proud
  - Not at all proud

- **How old were you when you stopped full time education?**
  - Still studying
  - No education
  - Age
  - Refusal

- **Gender**
  - Male
  - Female

- **How old are you?** (Age Scale)

- 15-24 years
- 25-39 years
- 40-54 years
- 55 years and older

- **What is your current occupation**? (Occupation Scale)
  - Self employed
  - Managers
  - Other white collars
  - Manual workers
  - House persons
  - Unemployed
  - Retired
  - Students

- **If there were a "General Election" tomorrow, which party WOULD YOU VOTE for?**
  - Party names
  - Other Party
  - Would vote blank/would spoil the vote
  - Would not vote
  - DK/ no opinion
  - Refusal

Transatlantic Trends Survey

- **Generally speaking, do you think that Turkey's membership to the EU would be…?**
  - A good thing
  - bad thing
  - Neither good nor bad
  - DK
  - Refusal

- **Vote intentions next elections**
  - Party names
  - Not allowed to vote
  - Other party
  - No party, won't vote/blank vote
  - DK/RA

- **Age when finished full time education**
  - Never been in full-time education

- Still in full time education
- Age
- Refusal

- **Age (scale)**
  - 18-24 years
  - 25-34 years
  - 35-44 years
  - 45-54 years
  - 55-64 years
  - 65 years

- **Gender**
  - Male
  - Female

- **As far as your current occupation is concerned would you say you are self-employed, an employee, a manual worker or would you say that you are without a professional activity?**
  - Farmer, forester, fisherman
  - Owner of a shop, craftsman
  - Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, etc.)
  - Manager of a company
  - Other self-employed (SPECIFY)
  - Professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect)
  - General management, director or top management
  - Middle management
  - Civil servant
  - Office clerk
  - Other employee (salesman, nurse, etc.)
  - Other employee
  - Supervisor\ foreman (team manager, etc.)
  - Manual worker
  - Unskilled manual worker
  - Other manual worker
  - Looking after the home
  - Student (full-time)
  - Retired
  - Seeking a job
  - Other without a professional activity
  - Refusal